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Introduction
In September 2004, the Bush administration announced that
it would send drug discount cards to 1.8 million low-income
Medicare beneficiaries, admitting that, contrary to early
predictions and despite the rising costs of prescription drugs,
millions of eligible beneficiaries had not enrolled in the Medicare
Prescription Drug Discount Card Program.'
At first glance,
nonparticipation in the drug-discount card program is puzzling:
the program enables Medicare beneficiaries to save ten to twentyfive percent on prescription drugs and credits low-income enrollees
with up to $1,200 for the purchase of prescription drugs.2 A closer
look at the Program's mechanics, however, uncovers why many
senior citizens do not take advantage of the program. To enroll in
the program, a beneficiary must learn about the new program,
select one discount card among approximately seventy available
cards that offer different coverage packages, pay up to thirty
dollars for a card, and fill out several forms.3 A person who has
access to the Internet and is comfortable with computers could
gather and process the relevant information in a couple of hours.4
Many senior citizens, however, are uncomfortable with computers
and their decision-making capacity may be impaired.5 Put simply,

1. Robert Pear, Low-Income Nonapplicants to Get Medicare Drug Cards, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 23, 2004, at A18. The Medicare Prescription Drug Discount Card
Program was enacted into law as part of the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066
(2003). It is a transitory program expected to be replaced in 2006 by Medicare
prescription drug benefits. Id.
2. See Fact Sheet, Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Serv., Medicare Prescription
Drug Discount Card and Transitional Assistance Program (Mar. 26, 2004),
available
at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/media/press/release.asp?Counter=990
(describing the Prescription Drug Discount Card Program).
3. Id.
4. Several websites offer valuable information on drug discount cards and
advise how to select cards. See, e.g., CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV.,
MEDICARE-APPROVED
PRESCRIPTION
DRUG
DIscouNT
CARD
PROGRAM,
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicarereform/drugcard (last visited Sept. 11, 2005).
5. See Drug Discount Confusion, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2004, at A18; Drug Card
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enrolling in the drug-discount card program is unfavorable for
many eligible beneficiaries and is particularly difficult to the
more-disadvantaged
ones.6
Accordingly,
while
general
nonparticipation in the program should raise concerns, the
immediate concern to be addressed is the nonparticipation of the
more-disadvantaged beneficiaries. Nonparticipation in welfare
programs has attracted relatively little attention from legal
scholars, despite the tremendous interest of legal academia in
redistribution, and the fact that welfare benefits are among the
most direct means of redistribution. This Article studies the
causes of nonparticipation in welfare programs, shows that similar
participation patterns are common in many welfare programs, and
seeks to focus attention on the characteristics of nonparticipants.
Nonparticipation in welfare programs is rather common, even
in well-known programs and among young eligible individuals.7
The low percentages of individuals eligible for welfare benefits
who actually receive them ("participation rates") are a well-known
fact. Low participation rates among low-income individuals are
perplexing because for such individuals the value of a given
benefit is relatively high.8 Nobel laureate Gary Becker suggested
Confusion, WASH. POST, June 22, 2004, at A16; Sarah Lueck, Changes in Medicare
Found Lacking, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2004, at D3.
6. A comparison to the participation in Medicare Part B (optional
supplementary medical insurance) is instructive. Senior citizens automatically
enroll in Medicare Parts A (mandatory hospital insurance) and B, and they can opt
out Part B only if they fill out a form. In 2003, approximately ninety-six percent of
the eligible individuals enrolled in Part B. For national and state statistics, see
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES ENROLLED BY
STATE

AS

OF

JULY

1,

1999

2003,

http://www.cms.hhs.gov/statistics/enrollment/stenrtrend99_03.asp
(last
visited
Sept. 11, 2005).
7. For a comprehensive review of the empirical literature on nonparticipation
in welfare programs, see Janet Currie, The Take Up of Social Benefits (Apr. 2004)
(unpublished
manuscript,
on
file
with
the
author),
available at
http://urbanpolicy.berkeley.edu/pdf/Ch3CurrieO6O4.pdf.
8. See, e.g., Robert Moffitt, An Economic Model of Welfare Stigma, 73 AM.
ECON. REv. 1023, 1023 (1983) ("[The more-is-better-than-less] tenet seems to be
violated by the behavior of many individuals in the low-income population, for
many turn out to be eligible for a positive welfare benefit but do not in fact join the
welfare rolls."); David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of the
Personal Choice Model for Rationing Public Benefits, 113 YALE L.J. 815, 830-31
(2004):
The more desperate families ... could be expected to endure [administrative and social] burdens because they have nowhere else to turn. The others may drop away as they perceive the transaction costs to approach or
equal the value of the benefit. This is possible because the marginal utility
[of a benefit] declines as income rises. If the benefit is food assistance, it
may mean the difference between a monotonous diet and a more balanced
one for the less desperate families but may be crucial to helping their more
desperate neighbors have enough food to eat through the month.
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that eligible individuals choose not to participate in welfare
programs "because they anticipate that receiving [welfare] benefits
would actually lower their utility through the development of
dependency and other bad habits."9 As the example of the
Medicare drug discount cards illustrates, this view does not
capture all the causes of nonparticipation.
Indeed, welfare
scholars generally view Becker's approach as too narrow and
believe that other or additional burdens discourage eligible
individuals from enrolling in welfare programs."
Becker's
underlying logic, however, remains unchallenged:
when
participation burdens are (or perceived to be) greater than the
expected benefit, the benefit becomes unwelcome." Such overly
costly benefits are referred to in this Article as unwelcome benefits.
Unwelcome benefits resemble familiar situations of everyday
life. For example, commercial coupons confer financial benefits
upon eligible individuals. Nevertheless, many people do not use
available
coupons
because
of
embarrassment,
hassle,
forgetfulness, and other causes."
For similar reasons, many
Americans do not join the American Association of Retired Persons
("AARP") when they become eligible at age fifty and instead do so
close to retirement age. 3 Psychologists identified a related human
propensity: individuals often value a benefit loss less than they
value an equivalent out-of-pocket expense. 4 In other words, there
9. GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 21 (1996). It is noteworthy that
several conservative scholars were convinced that eligible individuals would almost
always take advantage of welfare benefits. See, e.g., MARTIN ANDERSON, WELFARE:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WELFARE REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES 38 (1978)
("There will be isolated instances where a person is unaware of being eligible, or is
unjustly denied aid by a welfare bureaucrat, or simply chooses not to accept the
social stigma of being on welfare. But these cases are the exceptions."); James M.
Buchanan, The Samaritan's Dilemma, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY AND ECONOMIC
THEORY 71 (Edmund Phelps ed., 1975) (defining the "Samaritan's dilemma:"
governmental altruism could induce the poor to act in socially sub-optimal ways in
order to take advantage of anticipated redistributive transfers).
10. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 7; Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare
Administration: Rules, Discretion, and EntrepreneurialGovernment, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1121 (2000); Super, supra note 8.
11. Becker, supra note 9, at 21.
12. See generally Joseph Bonnici et al., Consumer Issues in Coupon Usage: An
Exploratory Analysis, 13 J. APPLIED BUS. RES. 31 (1996/1997); Chakravarthi
Narasimhan, A Price Discrimination Theory of Coupons, 3 MARKETING SCI. 128
(1984).
13. See Dipak K. Gupta et al., Group Utility in the Micro Motivation of
Collective Action: The Case of Membership in the AARP, 32 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 301 (1997).
14. See generally Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss
Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 203-04 (1991); Richard H.
Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG.
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exist circumstances in which a given dollar amount in the form of
costs associated with benefit redemption would deter take up, but
the same dollar amount would not suffice to compensate for a loss
of an asset equivalent to the waived benefit. This behavioral bias
is one facet of the endowment effect that captures the difference
between opportunity costs and equivalent out-of-pocket expenses."
The endowment effect, although unrelated to actual participation
burdens, may therefore increase a propensity to refrain from using
available benefits.
A review of the existing literature on participation in welfare
programs reveals a deep gap between the legal and economic
literature.
The legal literature primarily explains how
discretionary eligibility criteria influence the provision of welfare
benefits,' 6 while the economic literature utilizes primarily formal,
non-discretionary eligibility criteria to estimate participation rates
and to identify determinants of participation, such as age,
education, marriage prospects, health, need, and race. 7 As a
result of this gap, known participation determinants are not fully
incorporated in the legal literature and economic estimations of
participation rates tend to conclude that participation rates are
lower than they actually are.' 8 The reason for this estimation bias
is that the implementation of discretionary eligibility criteria
disqualifies some individuals who meet formal eligibility criteria. 9
39, 43-47 (1980).
15. See Kahneman et al., supra note 14; Thaler, supra note 14.
16. For recent important works, see Diller, supra note 10; Super, supra note 8;
David A. Super, The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 633
(2004). For earlier representative studies, see Joel F. Handler, Discretion in Social
Welfare: The Uneasy Position in the Rule of Law, 92 YALE L.J. 1270 (1983); Jerry L.
Mashaw, Welfare Reform and Local Administration of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children in Virginia, 57 VA. L. REV. 818 (1971).
17. See, e.g., Rebecca Blank & Patricia Ruggles, When Do Women Use Aid to
Families with Dependent Children and Food Stamps? The Dynamics of Eligibility
versus Participation, 31 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 57, 80-81 (1996) (estimating the
effects of age, disabilities, education, marital status, race, and other factors on the
propensity to participate in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC')
and Food Stamp programs); Richard D. Coe, Nonparticipationin Welfare Programs
by Eligible Households: The Case of the Food Stamp Program, 17 J. ECON. ISSUES
1035, 1041-42 (1983) (estimating the effects of demographics on the propensity to
participate in the Food Stamp program). For a recent comprehensive survey of the
economic literature, see Currie, supra note 7. For detailed reviews of participation
in specific welfare programs, see MEANS-TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN THE
UNITED STATES (Robert A. Moffitt ed., University of Chicago Press, 2003)
[hereinafter MEANS-TESTED].
18. Eligibility estimations pose a serious challenge for empiricists.
The
foregoing argument is limited to a neglected factor that results in downward biased
estimations.
19. See infra Part I.B.
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Accordingly, an assessment of the number of eligible individuals
that does not take into account informal eligibility criteria is likely
to result in overestimation. Since the participation rate in a
specific program is the number of participants divided by the
number of eligible individuals, overestimated denominators lead to
inaccurately low assessments of participation rates. 20
This
estimation bias overemphasizes the general problem of
nonparticipation and downplays the problems of the more
disadvantaged individuals.
Contrary to this observation,
policymakers, welfare advocates, and scholars regularly cite
general participation rates to support or refute various
arguments. 21
This Article explains why present estimations of general
participation rates are misleading. The Article inquires into the
participation patterns of eligible individuals and shows that
present impediments to benefits disproportionately burden the
most and least disadvantaged eligible individuals and decrease
their propensity to participate in welfare programs.
Such
polarized participation patterns 22 imply that general participation
rates, by themselves, teach very little about the performance of
welfare programs. 2 Situations of nearly ineligible individuals who
forgo meager benefits24 and of eligible individuals who forgo
relatively
large
benefits
are
fundamentally
different.25
Nonparticipation of nearly ineligible individuals results from the
offering of impractically small benefits.
By contrast,
nonparticipation of eligible individuals who forgo relatively large
benefits suggests that those who need the benefits the most face
significant impediments to benefits. 26 General participation rates
pool these groups and others together, thereby distracting the
attention away from the more important problems of the neediest
individuals.

20. See infra Part I.B.
21. See infra Part I.B.
22. The term "polarized participation patterns" is used in this Article to
describe the effects of the impediments to benefits faced by the most and the least
disadvantaged individuals. The term does not imply that the groups at the poles of
the spectrum are similar in size or density. See infra Part I.D.2.
23. See infra Part I.D.
24. For example, the minimum monthly allotment of food stamps for
households of one or two persons is ten dollars. 7 U.S.C. § 2017(a) (2000). Parts II
and III analyze the participation costs of eligible individuals and explain why
working eligible individuals and other eligible individuals whose available benefits
are small tend to incur high participation costs.
25. See infra Parts II, III.
26. See infra Parts II, III.
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For simplicity, this Article is focused on means-tested welfare
programs 7 and, more specifically, the Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families ("TANF") and Food Stamp programs. Other
welfare programs are discussed in specific contexts and compared
to the TANF and Food Stamp programs.
The TANF program is the major federal welfare program
providing cash assistance to low-income households. The program,
created by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 ("PRWORA)," replaced the sixty-yearold Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") program.29
Under TANF, states receive fixed lump-sum payments, known as
block grants, and have broad discretion regarding how to design
and administer benefit levels, benefit forms, and eligibility
criteria, including time limits and conditions on eligibility. 30 It is
estimated that approximately sixty percent of TANF-eligible
households do not use the TANF benefits. 31
The Food Stamp Program is the major federal welfare
program offering food assistance to low-income households. The
program began as a small pilot program in 1961 and gradually
expanded. In 1971, national eligibility standards were established
and all states were required to inform eligible households about
the program. The Food Stamp Program is federally funded and
most of its eligibility rules are set at the federal level pursuant to
the Food Stamp Act of 1977"' and its regulations.33 One important
feature of the nationwide uniform eligibility rules for food stamps
is that they mitigate the variation in state welfare programs. For

27. Means-tested welfare programs are programs in which eligibility and
benefit levels are inversely related to income and sometimes resources. For
comprehensive reviews of the major means-tested programs in the United States,
see MEANS-TESTED, supra note 17.
28. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
29. See R. KENT WEAVER, ENDING WELFARE AS WE KNOW IT (2000) (discussing
the politics of cash-assistance programs in the United States).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(B) (2005). Under the AFDC program, eligibility
criteria were uniform nationwide and benefit levels were set by the states. The
states and the federal government shared the funding of AFDC benefits. For a
brief description of AFDC and TANF, see Robert A. Moffitt, The Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families Program, in MEANS-TESTED, supra note 17, at 291,
292-307.
31. Moffitt, supra note 30, at 308-09 n.17 (showing participation rates of single
mothers and noting that married families "have always been a minor fraction of the
caseload").
32. Food Stamp Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-113, 91 Stat. 958 (1977).
33. For a brief history of the Food Stamp Program, see Janet Currie, U.S. Food
and Nutrition Programs,in MEANS-TESTED, supranote 17, at 199, 201-13.

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 24:107

example, in 2000, in California and Wisconsin the maximum
monthly food-stamp benefit for a family of four was below $200,
while in Mississippi and Texas it was above $300. In comparison,
in the same year, the maximum monthly TANF benefit for a
family of four was over $600 in California and Wisconsin and $200
It is estimated that
or less in Mississippi and Texas.34
approximately forty percent of food-stamp eligible households
forgo the food-stamp benefits."
The plan of this Article is as follows. Part I explores the
functional structures of common welfare programs and focuses on
impediments to benefits in the forms of monetary and opportunity
costs of eligible individuals. It shows that reasonable designs of
welfare bureaucracies tend to lead to polarized participation
patterns among eligible individuals. Part I also explains how
PRWORA increased the costs of participation in welfare programs
and how it provides states with incentives to raise further
participation costs and to sustain certain polarized participation
patterns.
Part II extends the analysis to non-monetary
participation costs and addresses participation patterns created by
information and self-esteem related costs.
It explains why
information about welfare benefits and application procedures is
costlier for some eligible individuals than for other eligible
individuals, why self-esteem affects participation in welfare
programs, and which individuals tend to be more sensitive to selfesteem. Part III addresses several legal and policy implications.
First, it emphasizes the importance of understanding the
characteristics of nonparticipants rather than addressing the
general phenomenon of nonparticipation. Second, it suggests
several simple
administrative means that could lower
participation costs and increase participation rates. Third, Part
III outlines general principles that should guide the balance
between eligibility and benefit size, the framing of benefits, and
choices among benefits.
Fourth, it addresses the burdens
PRWORA's work requirements impose on the more disadvantaged
individuals and those who attempt to conform to social norms of
self-sufficiency.
Finally, Part III addresses the burdens that
PRWORA's time limits impose on the more disadvantaged
individuals. Part IV provides concluding remarks.

34. In California and Wisconsin food stamps amounted to less than twenty-five
percent of cash and food assistance, while in Mississippi and Texas food stamps
amounted to more than sixty percent of cash and food assistance. Id. at 206.
35. KAREN CUNNYNGHAM, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., TRENDS IN FOOD STAMP
PROGRAM PARTICIPATION RATES: 1994 TO 2000 (2002).
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I.

Welfare Bureaucracies and Participation Disincentives

This Part examines the functional structures of common
welfare programs and explains how the private costs they impose
on potentially eligible individuals may discourage such individuals
from using available benefits.36 Part L.A presents the need of
welfare administrations for screening mechanisms and explains
why such mechanisms tend to deter some eligible individuals.
Part I.B examines the private costs generated by discretionary
eligibility criteria and discusses their consequences. Part I.C
presents the incentives of states to raise private costs of eligible
individuals and to decrease participation rates. Part I.D shows
why heterogeneity of eligible individuals is likely to create
polarized participation patterns. The analysis of heterogeneity of
eligible individuals summarizes and applies the findings of Parts
I.A-C regarding the characteristics of eligible individuals who are
likely to refrain from participating in welfare programs.
A. Screening Mechanisms and Private Costs
1.

The Problem of Asymmetric Information

Welfare benefits are offered by federal and state governments
and are administered by welfare bureaucracies that determine
applicants' eligibility and eligibility levels. As such, welfare
bureaucrats are the gatekeepers who stand between benefits and
claimants. Their stated role is to screen claimants, to ensure that
only eligible ones receive benefits, and to promote official social
goals, such as reducing out-of-wedlock pregnancies37 and welfare

36. The social costs of screening mechanisms employed for redistribution are
beyond the scope of this Article. In general, economists believe that, subject to
conflicting goals, the deadweight loss associated with redistribution may be
minimized when redistribution is conducted through the tax and transfer system.
See, e.g., Aanund Hylland & Richard Zeckhauser, DistributionalObjectives Should
Affect Taxes But Not Program Choice or Design, 81 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 264
(1979); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?
Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29
J. LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System
is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in RedistributingIncome, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.
667 (1994).
37. PROWRA condemns out-of-wedlock pregnancies and motivates states to
fight against such pregnancies. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601(a)(3), 603(a)(2), 613(e) (2000);
45 C.F.R. § 270.4(f) (2004) (defining a formula to measure states' performance
family formation). See generally Charles Murray, Family Formation, in THE NEW
WORLD OF WELFARE 137 (Rebecca Blank & Ron Haskins eds., 2001) (discussing the
affects of family structure on welfare).

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 24:107

dependence."5
Determination of eligibility and eligibility levels are not
simple tasks since eligibility criteria are often based on personal
properties that are private information. 39 For example, income"
and disabilities4 1 are common eligibility determinants of many
welfare programs and tend to be private information of potentially
eligible individuals. To overcome this problem of asymmetric
information, welfare agencies employ two types of screening
mechanisms: direct screening mechanisms that elicit relevant
private information from welfare applicants and self-selection
screening mechanisms that offer benefits that are designed to
attract only targeted individuals.4 ' As explained in the following
Parts, each form of screening mechanisms may transform
available benefits into unwelcome benefits.
2.

Direct Screening Mechanisms

a.

FunctionalStructure

Direct screening mechanisms use bureaucracies to elicit
private information by requiring the production of documentation
that proves eligibility.
The provision of the required
documentation and the accompanying encounters with welfare
bureaucrats constitute costly impediments to benefits for welfare
applicants. The private costs of such impediments to benefits vary

38. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(2) (2000) (stating that, among other purposes,
TANF programs should be designed to "end the dependence of needy parents on
government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage"); 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a)(1)(A)(i) (instructing states to design TANF programs that would enable
needy families to become self sufficient); 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7) (2000) (limiting,
subject to exceptions, TANF cash assistance to sixty months).
39. See generally Milton Harris & Robert M. Townsend, Resource Allocation
UnderAsymmetric Information, 49 ECONOMETRIcA 33 (1981).
40. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2014 (2000) (defining eligibility for food stamps); 29
U.S.C. § 1603 (2000) (defining eligibility for job training); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)
(2000) (defining eligibility for Medicaid).
41. Four principal public benefit programs provide benefits for the aged, blind,
or disabled: Social Security Disability Insurance, Supplemental Security Income,
Medicare, and Medicaid. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a) (2000) (defining eligibility for
Supplemental Security benefits). The Job Training Partnership Act creates
training programs for unskilled individuals and allows limited participation of
individuals who are not economically disadvantaged, if such individuals have
encountered barriers to employment, such as language proficiency, school dropouts,
handicaps, alcoholism, or addictions. See 29 U.S.C. § 1603 (a)(2) (2000); 42 U.S.C. §
423 (2000) (defining eligibility for Social Security Disability Insurance).
42. For a general discussion, see Albert L. Nichols & Richard J. Zeckhauser,
Targeting Transfers Through Restrictions On Recipients, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 372
(1982).
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across individuals and supposedly impose higher burdens on
ineligible applicants and lower the potential gains of fraud.4 3 For
example, the investment in paperwork tends to be less profitable
for ineligible individuals than for eligible individuals, because the
former are less likely to be determined eligible for benefits.
Similarly, other things being equal, the opportunity costs
generated by visits at welfare centers are higher for individuals
with alternative income sources than for individuals with no such
alternative sources."
Since the private costs of ineligible
applicants are supposedly higher than those of eligible applicants,
theoretically there is a level of private costs that deters only
ineligible individuals from applying for benefits.
The functional structure of direct screening mechanisms is
illustrated in Figure 1, which depicts the indifference curves of two
types of individuals: 0e, representing eligible individuals, and 0j,
representing ineligible individuals.
FIGURE 1
Indiffere e Curves
io~~~~......
-- :.:........

Benefit (b)

10i

(IB,

1

...........................................................
...
... ........

b)

b

----------------------B )B
(0,0)

lB

l-

Impediments to Benefits (IB)

43. See id., at 376-77.
44. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(e)(8) (2000) (detailing that in the case of
Medicare, eligibility requires recertification every twelve months, but states may
require Medicare beneficiaries to establish eligibility as often as every six months);
7 C.F.R. §§ 273.14(b)(3), 273.2(e) (2005) (stating the Food Stamp regulations
require a face-to-face interview at least once every twelve months and authorize
state agencies to require more frequent interviews); 7 C.F.R. § 2 7 3 .2(c) (2005)
(stating the Food Stamp regulation also provides that "[elach household has the
right to file an application form on the same day it contacts the food stamp office
during office hours"); MICHAEL PONZA ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., CUSTOMER
SERVICE

IN

THE

FOOD

STAMP

PROGRAM

42-43

(1999),

http://www.fns.usda.gov/oane/MENU/Published/FSP/FILES/ProgramOperations/fs
pcust.pdf (stating in practice, more than forty percent of applicants have to make
more than one trip to the food stamp office).

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 24:107

The utility of a benefit for each type of individual is identical
along her indifference curve, so that she is indifferent among the
combinations of benefits and impediments to benefits lying on her
indifference curve. Individuals have different indifference curves
because while the monetary value of a benefit does not change
across individuals, the costs of impediments to benefits are higher
for ineligible individuals than for eligible individuals.45 As a
result, for any level of benefits there is a range of impediments to
benefits that would deter ineligible individuals from applying for
benefits, but would not deter eligible individuals.
The depicted indifference curves cross at point (o,o), where no
benefits are offered and there are no impediments to benefits.
Since o, and o, are indifferent among the combinations of benefits
and impediments to benefits along their indifference curves, each
type would refrain from applying for any combination (iB,b) that
lies on her depicted indifference curve. Each type, however, would
be better off applying for a benefit at any point left to her
indifference curve, despite the costs generated by the impediments
to benefits at that point. For example, an ineligible individual
would not gain from applying and receiving a benefit at point
(IB,b), because it is on her indifference curve; however, applying for
a benefit at point (T,b) would improve her position because at this
point the benefit value outweighs the costs of the impediments to
benefits (i.e., B < 7 ). In contrast, applying for a benefit at any
point (IBb) right of her indifference curve would cost the individual
more than the expected value of the benefit. Thus, when the
offered benefit is at point (lB, b), both types of individuals refrain
from applying for the benefit. The screening goal is attained when
the offered benefit is at a point in the area between the
indifference curves of eligible and ineligible individuals, say at
point (IB,b), and then only eligible individuals, o,, apply for the
offered benefit.
Further sorting of welfare claimants is often conducted
through the same screening technique used to distinguish between
eligible and ineligible individuals. The information elicited by
direct screening mechanisms often allows welfare bureaucrats to
determine eligibility levels of welfare claimants. For example,
under the Food Stamp Program, the impediments to benefits are
designed, among other things, to elicit information on claimants'
45. That is, for any IB* and b, co (IB* .b*)<c o (IB*. b*) ,where co (IB*,b*) are
the participation costs of type 0,, j=[O,&,.
For variation in participation costs across
individuals, see supra note 43 and accompanying text; infra Part I.D.
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income.
The monthly allotment of a household is generally
determined by the maximum allotment for a household of that size
minus thirty percent of the household's income."
More generally, claimants who apply for large benefits may
be required to provide additional documents, such as medical bills
and court orders or cancelled checks for child support payments.
The production of such additional documents represents greater
impediments to benefits that are too costly for individuals who are
eligible for low levels of benefits. This type of direct screening
mechanism is illustrated in Figure 2, which depicts the
indifference curves of two types of eligible individuals, e, and o,,
and one type of ineligible individual, e,.
FIGURE2
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(LB, ):.X
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Impediments to Benefits (IB)

The eligibility level of o is higher than that of o,, or in other
words, e- is eligible for a larger benefit than the benefit o, is
eligible for. Consider, first, the benefit at point (IB,b). This benefit
is right to the indifference curve of ineligible individuals and left
to the indifference curves of both o, and o, so that it is

46. The maximum allotment value is determined and adjusted by the Secretary
of Agriculture, according to a "thrifty food plan," which is the diet required to feed a
family of four persons. See 7 U.S.C. 2017 (2000) (defining how allotments should be
calculated); 7 C.F.R. § 271.2 (2000) (defining the term "thrifty food plan");
Applicants & Recipients: Fact Sheet on Resources, Incomes, and Benefits, USDA
Food
&
Nutrition
Service,
at
http://www.fns.usda.gov/fsp/applicant-recipients/fs-ResBenElig.htm
(Sept. 23,
2005) (providing the values of maximum allotments for households). For this
property in welfare programs, see generally Brendan O'Flaherty, The Form of U.S.
In-Kind Assistance, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 401 (1999).
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unattractive for ineligible individuals and attractive for both types
of eligible individuals.
Thus, the benefit at point (IB,b)
distinguishes between eligible and ineligible individuals, but it is
not sensitive to differences between eligible individuals of different
eligibility levels. Consider now the benefit at point (IB,
b). For o,
and only for this type, this benefit is even better than the benefit
at (/B,b), despite the greater impediments to benefits.
Thus,
when benefits are offered at points (IB,b) and (/-B,b),
ineligible
individuals, e,, do not apply for benefits, eligible individuals of type
0, apply for and receive a small benefit at point (IB, b), and eligible
individuals of type o- apply for and receive a large benefit at point
(B, b).

b.

The Private Costs of Direct Screening Mechanisms

Impediments to benefits, or "ordeals," are probably the most
common type of screening mechanisms.
The social costs of
ordeals represent pure deadweight loss that society is willing to
tolerate for the promotion of specific redistributive goals. This
social sacrifice, however, often does not accomplish its stated goals
due to actual and perceived private costs of participation in
welfare programs that discourage large percentages of eligible
persons from applying for and participating in these programs.
For example, studies of participation in Medicaid consistently
indicate that bureaucratic barriers prevent many eligible
individuals from completing their applications. 9

47. In Figure 2, for 0-, any combination of a benefit and impediments to
benefits along the indifference curve I'_ is better than any combination of a
benefit and impediments to benefits along lo .
48. See, e.g., Michael Lipsky, Bureaucratic Disentitlement in Social Welfare
Programs, 58 SOC. SERV. REV. 3 (1984) (discussing administrative practices that
may prevent eligible individuals from obtaining benefits); see also MICHAEL LIPSKY,
STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES xi

(1980) [hereinafter STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY] (studying the structure of public
agencies "whose workers have discretion over the dispensation of benefits or the
allocation of public sanctions").
49. See, e.g., Jennifer Stuber & Karl Kronebusch, Stigma and Other
Determinants of Participationin TANF and Medicaid, 23 J. PUB. POL'Y & MGMT.
509 (2004); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH CARE REFORM: POTENTIAL
DIFFICULTIES IN DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR Low-INCOME PEOPLE (1994)

(studying the causes of low participation rates in Medicaid and concluding that the
vast majority of eligible nonparticipants were barred by bureaucratic barriers and
that states know little about these barriers); SHEILA R. ZEDLEWSKI ET AL., URBAN
INST.,

OCCASIONAL

PAPER NO.

64, FAMILIES COPING WITHOUT

EARNINGS OR

GOVERNMENT
CASH
ASSISTANCE
8-9
(2003),
available
at
http://www.urban.orgUploadedPDF/410634-OP64.pdf
(interviewing ninety-five
extremely poor families living without employment or government cash assistance
and finding that for twenty-eight percent of these families the primary reason for
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Ordeals discourage eligible individuals, especially those in
welfare programs, by diminishing eligibility levels of the kind
discussed above. Given the costs of impediments to benefits, such
programs tend to result in unattractive small benefits for eligible
individuals who are close to the eligibility threshold. For example,
households eligible for food stamps with relatively "high" income
may be eligible for a minimum monthly allotment of ten dollars. °
For many of these households, the private costs of participating in
the Food Stamp Program and using food stamps outweigh the
value of the offered benefit. Nonparticipation of this sort simply
reflects a positive relationship between the benefit size and
participation propensity. Indeed, situations of nearly-ineligible
individuals who refrain from using benefits are prevalent.5 For
example, in one study eligible women with relatively high income
or with short expected welfare spells were found the least likely to
enter welfare programs, presumably because the expected benefits
of enrollment did not outweigh the application and participation
costs.52 Evidence also indicates that eligible individuals whose
needs for the offered benefits are relatively low tend to refrain
from taking up these benefits more than other eligible individuals
do. 3 Such findings are hardly surprising since the marginal value
not-participating in TANF is the involved hassle).
50. 7 U.S.C. § 2017(a).
51. See, e.g., Nicholas A. Barr & Robert E. Hall, The Probabilityof Dependence
on Public Assistance, 48 ECONOMICA 109, 117-18 (1981) (finding a positive
relationship between the benefit level and probability of dependence on AFDC
benefits); Blank & Ruggles, supra note 17, at 79-83 (finding that participation in
the FSP increased with the size of the benefit); CUNNYNGHAM, supra note 35, at 12
(finding that participation rates in the Food Stamp Program generally decrease
with benefit levels, even among very poor households); Beth Daponte et al., Why Do
Low-Income Households Not Use Food Stamps? Evidence from an Experiment, 34 J.
HUM. RESOURCES 612 (1999) (finding that people eligible for larger food stamp
benefits are more likely to take them up); Kathleen McGarry, FactorsDetermining
Participation of the Elderly in Supplemental Security Income, 31 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 331 (1996) (finding a positive relationship between benefit size and the
likelihood of participation in the Supplemental Security Income program); PONZA
ET AL., supra note 44, at 34-37 (finding that households dissatisfied with the Food
Stamp Program are more likely to reside in urban areas and have low monthly food
stamp benefits compared with households that are satisfied).
52. Blank & Ruggles, supra note 17, at 80-81; see also Robert Plotnick,
Turnover in the AFDC Population: An Event History Analysis, 18 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 65 (1983).
53. See, e.g., Blank & Ruggles, supra note 17, at 80-81. (finding that the
likelihood of participation in the AFDC and Food Stamp programs among woman is
positively related to medical needs); Steven J. Haider et al., Food Stamps and the
Elderly: Why Is ParticipationSo Low?, 38 J. HUM. RESOURCES 1080 (2003) (finding
that the elderly who are eligible for food stamps but do not enroll in the Food
Stamp program tend to be less needy than other eligible individuals and the elderly
who do enroll); McGarry, supra note 51 (finding that the likelihood of participation
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of income normally declines with need.54
Direct screening mechanisms may also discourage some
eligible individuals when non-cash benefits are offered.
Statistically, welfare recipients value non-cash benefits below
their cost,55 although non-cash benefits are offered to provide for
very basic needs, such as nutrition and housing.56 This preference
of cash-equivalents over non-cash benefits is generally explained
by myopia of welfare recipients, divergence between private
interests and social interests underlying the provision of non-cash
benefits, 7 and reliance on the welfare systems to bail out in the
event of a crisis."5 The differences between perceived values of
non-cash benefits and their actual monetary values emphasize
that eligible individuals are not indifferent among various forms of
benefits of the same value, but rather attribute different values to
certain forms of benefits.
In actuality, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between
ordeals designed for screening purposes and garden-variety
ordeals that plague bureaucracies. 59 Like other bureaucracies,

in the Supplemental Security Income programs is negatively related to financial
sources).
54. See, e.g., Blank & Ruggles, supra note 17, at 51 (finding that participation
of eligible women in the AFDC and Food Stamp Programs is most likely to occur
"among women with lower current and future income"); John Fitzgerald, Welfare
Durations and the Marriage Markets: Evidence from the Survey of Income and
Program Participation,26 J. HUM. RESOURCES 545, 555-60 (1991) (finding that
AFDC spells are inversely related to propensity to end welfare through marriage).
55. One empirical manifestation of this preference of cash equivalents over inkind benefits is the "cash-out puzzle" that describes the tendency of the marginal
propensity to consume food purchased with food stamps to be much larger than
that out of cash income. See ROBERT BREUNING ET AL., U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., FOOD
ASSISTANCE AND RESEARCH REP. No. 12, EXPLAINING THE FOOD STAMP CASH-OUT
PUZZLE (2001) (finding that the cash-out puzzle is present predominantly in multiadult households); Thomas M. Fraker et al., The Effect of Food Stamp Cashout on
Food Expenditures:An Assessment of the Findings from Four Demonstrations, 30 J.
HUM. RESOURCES 633 (1995) (summarizing existing evidence on the cash-out
puzzle); see also William J. Reeder, The Benefits and Costs of the Section 8 Existing
Housing Program, 26 J. PUB. ECON. 349 (1985) (finding that, on average,
beneficiaries of public housing programs value a $100 subsidy at $83 and that
public-housing recipients are induced to consume 11% more housing and 6% less of
other goods than they would with the cash equivalents).
56. See generally Lester C. Thurow, Cash Versus In-Kind Transfers, 64 AM.
ECON. REV. 190 (1974).
57. A prime example of interest divergence is commodity specific externalities,
such as the case of vaccines. See generally id.
58. See, e.g., Stephen Coate, Altruism, the Samaritan's Dilemma, and
Government Transfer Policy, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 46 (1995) (justifying the provision
of public insurance benefits instead of cash equivalents); see also Buchanan, supra
note 9.
59. See, e.g., Coe, supra note 17, at 1039 (1983) (finding that approximately
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welfare agencies furnish their employees with low-powered
incentives and, consequently, many welfare workers have
insufficient motivations to carry out their tasks diligently and
consistently."
Furthermore, even when welfare workers are
sufficiently motivated, the lack of resources that characterize
welfare systems frequently make encounters with the welfare
system unpleasant, time consuming, and uncertain with respect to
outcomes. 1
Garden-variety bureaucratic ordeals differentiate
among individuals according to their opportunity costs and value
of additional income, and disproportionately burden the more and
the less disadvantaged individuals.
The less disadvantaged
eligible individuals are discouraged because of their opportunity
costs and small expected benefits.62 Garden-variety bureaucratic
ordeals, however, also disproportionately burden the more
disadvantaged individuals whose skills and abilities make it
particularly difficult for them to navigate through bureaucracies,
thereby also leading to nonparticipation among the more
disadvantaged eligible individuals. To summarize, garden-variety
bureaucratic ordeals are a characteristic of the welfare system
that has no functional purpose, yet their deterring impact on
eligible individuals may be significant and lead to polarized
participation patterns.
3.

Self-Selection Screening Mechanisms

a.

FunctionalStructure

In addition to direct screening mechanisms, governments

twenty percent of food-stamp eligible nonparticipant households refrained from
applying for food stamps because of administrative issues). For empirical studies of
state food stamp agencies' practices that affect applicants' and participants' private
costs, see SUSAN BARTLETT ET AL., FOOD STAMP PROGRAM ACCESS STUDY: ELIGIBLE
NONPARTICIPANTS (2003) [hereinafter ELIGIBLE NONPARTICIPANTS], available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/efan03013/efanO3Ol3-2/;
VIVIAN GABOR ET
AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., E-FAN No. 03013-1, FOOD STAMP PROGRAM ACCESS
STUDY: LOCAL OFFICE POLICIES AND PRACTICES (2003) [hereinafter LOCAL OFFICE
POLICIES
AND
PRACTICES],
available
at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/efan03Ol3/efan03013-1/.
60. For incentives in bureaucracies, see generally Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Reforming Public Bureaucracy Through Economic Incentives?, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
131 (1986); Jean Tirole, The Internal Organization of Government, 46 OXFORD
ECON. PAPERS 1 (1994).
For bureaucracies as a source of inefficiencies, see
generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM:
FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 148-49 (1985).
61. See STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY, supra note 48, at 29-39; Lipsky, supra
note 48.
62. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
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employ two forms of self-selection screening mechanisms: in-kind
benefits and subsidies. Both forms of benefits offer goods or
services at a reduced price that could be as low as zero for certain
in-kind benefits, such as public education. In-kind benefits and
subsidies function as screening mechanisms when untargeted
individuals buy on the market substitutes to the goods and
services that are offered at reduced prices.63 Put simply, selfselection screening mechanisms offer benefits that are forgone by
untargeted individuals in favor of market alternatives.' Figure 3
presents the functional structure of self-screening mechanisms
designed to distinguish between targeted individuals, o,, and
untargeted individuals, o., through their own choices.

FIGURE 3
Value of
Product Y'

Budget Constraints

~()V4.

0.0

e

yBB)

o

Non-Y Goods (X)

Product r is assumed to be a valuable good or service, such as
medical services 65 or education 6 6 y is available at varying levels of

63. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, Public Provisionof Private Goods and the
Redistribution of Income, 81 AM. EcON. REV. 979 (1991). In-kind benefits and
subsidies do not necessarily function as self-selection screening mechanisms and
may simply represent non-cash benefits intended to assure that public benefits are
used for specific goals, such as nutrition.
64. See generally Charles Blackorby & David Donaldson, Cash Versus Kind,
Self-Selection, and Efficient Transfers, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 691 (1988).
65. See generally David Cutler & Jonathan Gruber, Does Public Insurancee
Crowd Out Private Insurance?, 111 Q.J. ECON. 391 (1996); Stuber & Kornebusch,
supra note 49, at 519-24 (2004) (finding that individuals eligible for Medicaid
believe that Medicaid recipients receive inferior services from health providers). In
the case of medical insurance, screening mechanisms that rely on the value of the
public coverage mostly utilize employers' choices rather than choices of eligible
individuals. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Drug Law is Seen Leading to Cuts in Retiree
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quality and its consumption cannot be supplemented. That is, an
individual who consumes Yat level Y, cannot purchase additional Y
to improve the consumed quality of product y. The importance of
this characteristic is that, if the government offers a benefit 27 , a
benefit recipient cannot use his private funds to supplement its
quality. Rather, he can either consume Y at this quality level or
pay the full price of a higher quality level. Thus, if he has
preferences for quality and can afford quality he will forgo the
benefit. Figure 3 illustrates the choices each individual is facing
between quality level of Y and the consumption of all other
products, which is presented as the consumption of a composite
good x. The budget constraint of each individual determines the
upper boundary of the set of all feasible consumption bundles
available to him. The best affordable bundle for each individual is
at the point on his budget constraint that lies on the highest
attainable indifference curve. As shown, the best available bundle
for targeted individuals is (x,.Y9 , ) and the best available bundle

for untargeted individuals is

(X9 ,Y%-).

(Xo",Y'-)

is better than

" ,

(x ,Y ) because it contains Y of a higher quality and more x.
When the government offers a benefit, an individual who takes up
the benefit can use all his income to consume x, so that in addition
to the benefit targeted individuals can consume up to X0, and
untargeted individuals can consume up to Ye-. When the offered
benefit is iB, only targeted individuals can improve their position
by taking up the benefits. They will switch to bundle (X, ,YB),
increase the quality level of consumed Y and increase the
consumption of all other goods. Untargeted individuals will
refrain from taking benefit eB, because the bundle (X ,Y ) is not as
good as bundle (x e- ,Y ) , since it lies on a lower indifference curve
than that on which (x ,YrO ) lies.
Note that as long as the quality of the offered benefit is lower
than the quality of r4, only targeted individuals take up the
offered benefit and untargeted individuals purchase the market
alternative. When the offered benefit is eB, untargeted individuals
are indifferent between bundle (yo. ,yBB) and bundle (x 0 , y 9 ) , and
for any benefit of a higher quality than e' , untargeted individuals
are better off taking up the offered benefit. Therefore, the highest

Plans: Effect of Medicare Shift, N.Y. TIMEs, July 14, 2004, at Al (discussing
prospective cuts in drug coverage benefits provided by employers following the
expansion of Medicare coverage).
66. For a study of public education benefits, see Sam Peltzman, The Effect of
Government Subsidies-in-Kind on Private Expenditures: The Case of Higher
Education, 81 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1973).
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quality of Ythe government may offer is e'.
b.

Interpretationof Self-Selection Screening Mechanisms

The foregoing presentation of self-selection screening
mechanisms demonstrates that unwelcome benefits may be
ordinary policy tools. Certain welfare benefits are designed to
attract targeted individuals and to be forgone by untargeted
individuals, thereby promoting underlying redistributive goals.
Nevertheless, as in the case of direct screening mechanisms, selfselection screening mechanisms may also screen out eligible
individuals. In-kind benefits and subsidized goods and services
may be unwelcome by targeted individuals who have strong tastes
for quality and social status.67 For example, targeted families may
send their children to private schools to improve their prospects,
and similarly, some individuals eligible for Medicaid prefer to pay
This outcome is another
for private medical insurance."
illustration of unwelcome benefits resulting from heterogeneity
among eligible individuals. In this respect, heterogeneity in tastes
and heterogeneity in costs incurred during encounters with
bureaucratic impediments to benefits are similar in their effects.
B. The Costs of DiscretionaryEligibility Criteria
Until the 1960s, welfare workers had significant discretion
over the provision and termination of welfare assistance. This
discretion was often misused, especially against AfricanAmericans.69 The Civil Rights Movement led to formalization of
eligibility criteria, promoted transparency of the welfare system,
and mitigated occurrences of discrimination by welfare workers.
Formal eligibility criteria, however, presented new problems as
formal criteria can address only limited number of circumstances
that may not fit the specific conditions of many disadvantaged
individuals. The 1996 welfare reform re-introduced discretionary
eligibility criteria in the welfare system to enable states greater
flexibility in the provision of benefits. This feature of the reform
has been studied and criticized by many legal scholars. ° This Part
explains why often-discretionary criteria function very similarly to
the generic impediments to benefits discussed above and,
67. For the effects of the pursuit of status, see infra Part II.B.2.
68. See, e.g., supra note 65.
69. See, e.g., FRANCES Fox PTVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE

POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 151-58 (2d ed., 1993); Mashaw, supra
note 16.
70. For a comprehensive and important study, see Diller, supra note 10.
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therefore, may result in polarized participation patterns.
Discretionary eligibility criteria create disparities between
apparent eligibility for benefits and actual availability of benefits
because apparent eligibility tends to rely on formal criteria. In
most circumstances, discretionary criteria disqualify some
individuals who meet the formal criteria. Welfare laws may
authorize some discretion to qualify some individuals for benefits
who would not be eligible otherwise, but the scope of such
discretion is well defined to enforce budget constraints. In
contrast, discretion given to raise eligibility thresholds tends to be
less defined. For example, PRWORA authorizes states to exempt
up to twenty percent of their caseload from the sixty-month federal
time limit on TANF cash assistance in cases of extreme hardship'
and to count studying individuals as working individuals to satisfy
TANF work requirements, as long as such individuals constitute
up to twenty percent of families determined to be engaged in
work.2 In contrast, under TANF regulations, eligibility levels may
be related to compliance with "individual responsibility plans"
tailored by eligibility workers. 3 In a similar fashion, the Job
Training Partnership Act regulations provide that, while formal
eligibility is a prerequisite for application, enrollment eligibility is
discretionary and determined by eligibility workers.74
Discretionary eligibility criteria entail two types of costs:
costs of encounters with bureaucrats and meeting their
requirements, and uncertainty costs. The first type of costs is selfexplanatory. The second type of costs, uncertainty costs, result
from the fact that discretionary criteria are unlikely to be applied
consistently by all welfare workers, or even by an individual
welfare worker, due to factual complexities and human mistakes.
The costs associated with discretionary criteria affect first and

71. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(C). States may exceed the twenty percent limit and
pay from their own funds to cover for the excess exempted families.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 607(c)(2). Exempted studying individuals should participate in
vocational education activities or be a teen head of household who maintains
satisfactory school attendance.
73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 608(b); 45 C.F.R. §§ 261.12-13. The personal obligations of
such plans could include "going to school, maintaining certain grades, keeping
school-aged children in school, immunizing children, going to classes, or doing other
things that will help the individual become or remain employed in the private
sector." 45 C.F.R. § 261.12(b).
74. 20 C.F.R. §§ 628.505-515; see also Robert J. LaLonde, Employment and
Training Programs, in MEANS-TESTED, supra note 17, at 517, 520 ("Policy has
consistently required that program operators provide employment and training
services only to eligible individuals who they believe would benefit from the
program.").
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foremost the less disadvantaged individuals because, given the
small magnitude of their benefits, they are particularly sensitive
to changes in participation costs. Discretionary criteria, however,
may also affect the more disadvantaged individuals because they
induce conditions for "statistical discrimination," which occurs
when an agent with imperfect information utilizes a characteristic
to apply a decision-making rule that is based on perceived
distribution of characteristics in the relevant population. Such
decision rules may lead, in practice, to unequal treatment
75
although the agent has no intention to engage in discrimination.
For example, applicants with poor communication skills may be
disadvantaged in their interactions with welfare bureaucrats if the
welfare worker fails to understand their situation.7 '
Thus,
discretionary eligibility criteria constitute another factor that may
lead to polarized participation patterns.
In addition to its deterring effect on participation,
uncertainty created by discretionary criteria complicates the
estimation of participation rates, since it is hard to measure its
aggregate impact on eligibility and on the number of eligible
individuals.
Standard economic estimations tend to ignore
discretionary eligibility criteria, thereby possibly concluding that
participation rates are lower than they actually are.
Theoretically, discretionary eligibility criteria could improve
the well-being of disadvantaged individuals if welfare workers
could match benefits to needs with no additional costs for welfare
claimants.
In practice, many welfare advocates believe that
discretionary criteria are used to manipulate participation, rather
than to match benefits to needs." From this perspective, a welfare
system that employs only formal eligibility criteria could save the
costs of the bureaucracy required for the application of
discretionary criteria and increase the size of benefits.

75. In economics literature, models of statistical discriminations primarily
address labor and insurance markets. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of
Discrimination,in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS 3 (Orley C. Ashenfelter &
Albert Rees eds., 1973); B.G. Dahlby, Adverse Selection and Statistical
Discrimination:An Analysis of CanadianAutomobile Insurance, 20 J. PUB. ECON.
121 (1983); Edmund E. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62
AM. ECON. REV. 659 (1972).
76. See, e.g., Ana I. Balsa & Thomas G. McGuire, Statistical Discriminationin
Health Care, 20 J. HEALTH ECON. 881 (2001) (discussing statistical discrimination
by health care providers).
77. See Diller, supra note 10; Super, supranote 8.
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C. Deliberate Deterrence of Potentially Eligible Individuals

Thus far, the deterring effects of bureaucratic impediments
and other ordeals have been regarded as costly byproducts of
screening mechanisms and welfare bureaucracies. Discouraging
potentially eligible individuals from applying for welfare benefits,
however, may be one of the system's goals, rather than one of its
byproducts. This Part explains why states have incentives to
create additional impediments to benefits and which individuals
are most likely to be affected by the additional impediments to
benefits.
In the past, intentional bureaucratic impediments to benefits
might have been in violation of the Due Process Clause."8
PRWORA, however, abolished the federal entitlements to cash
assistance,79 opened the door to strategic denials of welfare
benefits, and strengthened incentives for such denials." Due to
these incentives, states and localities often employ bureaucratic
means to narrow the scope of benefit programs to pursue
particular political agendas,8 to push potentially eligible
individuals to other states,82 to keep the unused portions of the
block grants, 3 to avoid federal penalties for overpayments, 4 and to

78. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1970) (declaring that welfare
benefits "are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive
them" and their termination involves state action that adjudicates important
rights, and procedural due process is applicable to termination of welfare benefits);
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (concluding that a provision of the Social
Security Act requiring prompt payment of benefits to all eligible individuals had
the effect of making eligibility standards legally enforceable rights).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 601(b). For an analysis and the consequences of this legislation,
see Super, supra note 16.
80. Incentives for state denials of welfare benefits existed already prior to
PRWORA. See REBECCA M. BLANK, IT TAKES A NATION: A NEW AGENDA FOR
FIGHTING POVERTY 207-19 (rev. ed. 1998).
81. Given the complexity of welfare regulations, it is unclear whether, for the
public, bureaucratic means are less observable than formal eligibility criteria.
Changes in bureaucratic procedures, however, are likely to be less visible than
changes in formal eligibility criteria. Thus, the promotion of unpopular agendas,
modifications of past mistakes, and budget cuts can be facilitated through
bureaucratic means almost without attracting political opposition.
82. One of the arguments against the devolution of welfare responsibilities to
the states is that it would lead to a "race to the bottom:" states would cut benefits to
prevent becoming a magnet for welfare-seeking migrants. For analyses of this
argument, see F.H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, Welfare Magnets: The Race for
the Top, 5 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 141 (1997); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Poverty,
Residency, and Federalism:States' Duty of Impartiality Toward Newcomers, 1999
SUP. CT. REv. 277 (1999); Shauhin A. Talesh, Welfare Migration to CaptureHigher
Benefits: Factor Fiction?,32 CONN. L. REV. 675 (2000).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 603(a). Block grants paid to the states are unrelated to present
caseloads and states can keep all of the unused funds.
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gain performance bonuses. 85 For example, states that do not meet
TANF's minimum work rate requirements are subject to financial
penalties.86 A state with high unemployment rates that is under
risk of not meeting the work rate requirements has incentives to
deny TANF assistance to unemployed eligible individuals, almost
regardless of local economic conditions. Such incentives exist
because states' work rate requirements are independent of local
economic conditions.87 Furthermore, PRWORA treats caseload
reductions almost like increases in work participation rates. 88
Therefore, through caseload reductions states have been able to
meet work rate requirements, regardless of how many current or
former recipients are actually employed." Similarly, under the
Food Stamp Act, states may be fined" or rewarded 9' for
performance determined by "payment error rates" which are
defined by overpayments and underpayments, but not by
percentages of nonparticipating eligible individuals. 92 Denying
claimants could be a safe way to mitigate the risks of penalty.
States and localities discourage eligible individuals from
participating in welfare programs through diversion policies and
84. Federal policies that penalize states and localities for payment errors tend
to focus on overpayment, so that overpayments are costlier than underpayments.
See EVELYN Z. BRODKIN, THE FALSE PROMISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM:
IMPLEMENTING QUALITY CONTROL IN WELFARE 9-11, 94-100 (1986) (discussing the
asymmetry between penalties for overpayments and lack of penalties for
underpayments in the Aid for Families with Dependent Children program that
preceded TANF); Timothy J. Casey & Mary R. Mannix, Quality Control in Public
Assistance: Victimizing the Poor Through One-Sided Accountability, 22
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1381, 1381-83 (1989) (analyzing the effects of penalties for
overpayment).
85. States that promote self-sufficiency among welfare recipients may be
rewarded up to $200 million a year. 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(4) (providing a framework
for performance bonuses); 45 C.F.R. §§ 270.1-270.5 (defining performance
formulas).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(3).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 607(b). For the conditions that may mitigate minimum work
rates, see 45 C.F.R. §§ 261.52, 262.5.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 607(b)(3); see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 261.21, 261.23 (defining
minimum work participation rates); 45 C.F.R. § 261.40 (allowing reduction of work
participation requirements for decreases in caseload).
89. 45 C.F.R. § 261.40 (allowing reduction of work participation requirements
for decreases in caseload).
90. 7 U.S.C. § 2025(c)(1)(C), as amended by Section 4019 of the Farm Security
and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171 § 4019, 116 Stat. 321
(providing that the amendment shall not apply before 2004).
91. 7 U.S.C. § 2025(c)(1).
92. 7 U.S.C. § 2025(c)(2). For an analysis of the skewed incentives created by
this reward structure, see Ed Bolen, A PoorMeasure of the Wrong Thing: The Food
Stamp Program's Quality Control System Discourage Participation by Working
Families, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 213 (2001).
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bureaucratic impediments to benefits. Diversion programs seek to
dissuade potentially eligible individuals from applying for welfare
benefits by offering a lump-sum payment in lieu of a larger
ongoing assistance (in net present value terms), imposing job
search requirements as a precondition for eligibility, and
encouraging applicants to seek alternative income sources."
Bureaucratic impediments aimed at discouraging eligible
individuals from applying for benefits may take many forms.
Examples include conditioning the right to apply for benefits on
several visits to the welfare office, not notifying welfare claimants
of rights they are not aware of, refraining from providing
application materials, providing confusing application forms,
denying the existence of available benefits, and institutionalizing
efforts to dissuade claimants from applying for benefits. Such
practices and others were introduced in New York City by the
Giuliani administration. 94
Many states' administrations of
Medicaid programs follow similar patterns. According to a study
conducted in Georgia, Illinois, and Massachusetts, approximately
fifty percent of Medicaid applications are denied because
applicants cannot provide the necessary documentation within
95 the
required time or fail to attend all of the required interviews.
Efforts to discourage participation in welfare programs are
likely to contribute to polarized participation patterns in a fashion
similar to that of the previously discussed impediments to
benefits.
Such efforts have a powerful impact on the less
93. See generally Diller, supra note 10, at 1152-57 (describing common
diversion strategies); Rebecca A. London, Which TANF Applicants Are Diverted,
and What Are Their Outcomes?, 77 SOC. SERV. REV. 373 (2003) (noting that at
least 34 states employ diversion policies); KATHLEEN A. MALOY ET AL., DIVERSION
AS A WORK-ORIENTED WELFARE REFORM STRATEGY AND ITS EFFECT ON ACCESS TO
MEDICAID: AN EXAMINATION OF THE EXPERIENCES OF FIVE LOCAL COMMUNITIES
(1999) (providing a comprehensive study of diversion policies).
94. Several studies and courts examined the practices employed by the Giuliani
administration and concluded that they violated the law. See, e.g., Reynolds v.
Giuliani, 118 F. Supp. 2d 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Reynolds v. Giuliani, 43 F. Supp. 2d
492 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999);
FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., NEW YORK PROGRAM ACCESS
REVIEW
NOV.-DEC.
1998
(1999),
available
at
http://www.welfarelaw.org/contents/webbulnyprog5.pdf;
Alice Bers, Reforming
Welfare After Welfare Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 571 (2001) (describing
the bureaucratic impediments and analyzing the Reynolds cases); Comm. on Soc.
Welfare Law, Welfare Reform in New York City: The Measure of Success, 56 REC.
ASS'N B. CITY N.Y. 322 (2001) (questioning the success of the Giuliani programs);
Comm. on Soc. Welfare Law, The Wages of Welfare Reform: A Report on New York
City's Job Centers, 54 REC. ASS'N B. CITY N.Y. 472 (1999) (describing the job center
program).
95. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 49. See also Stuber &
Kornebusch, supra note 49 (providing similar findings in other states).
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disadvantaged individuals because of their sensitivity to
participation costs and on the more disadvantaged individuals
because of their difficulties in navigating through bureaucracies
and overcoming bureaucratic hurdles.
D. Heterogeneity of Eligible Individuals and Participation
Patterns
The previous Parts emphasized that common impediments to
benefits do not burden all eligible individuals equally. Rather, the
more and the less disadvantaged individuals are often particularly
sensitive to certain forms of impediments to benefits, albeit for
different reasons. This non-uniform burden of impediments to
benefits is a product of the design of welfare mechanisms for
typical profiles of targeted individuals.
In actuality, eligible
individuals are not alike and, therefore, impediments to benefits
are costlier for some of them than for others.
This Part
summarizes and extends the previous conclusions regarding the
propensity of eligible individuals to refrain from applying for
welfare benefits by focusing on the meaning of heterogeneity in
the context of facing impediments to benefits.
Part I.D. 1
graphically illustrates the meaning of heterogeneity by presenting
three subtypes of eligible individuals: burdened, average, and
advantaged ones. Part I.D.2 explains which individuals are likely
to fall within each subtype of eligible individuals and addresses
the nature of the distribution of participation in welfare programs.
1.

The Meaning of Heterogeneity

Figure 4 illustrates how heterogeneity of eligible individuals
may create situations of unwelcome benefits.
FIGURE 4
Benefit (b) A

01-

10

Impediments to Benefits (IB)
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In this illustration, the welfare program is designed to
distinguish between eligible and ineligible individuals, 0o and 9i,
respectively. There are three subtypes of eligible individuals:
average eligible individuals, o,; burdened eligible individuals, o.,
for whom impediments to benefits are costlier than for average
eligible individuals; and advantaged eligible individuals, o,,, for
whom impediments to benefits are less costly than for average
eligible individuals. The differences among the subtypes are
represented by their indifference curves. The indifference curve of
burdened eligible individuals is left of the indifference curve of
average eligible individuals and the indifference curve of
advantaged eligible individuals is right to the indifference curve of
average eligible individuals. Only combinations of benefits and
impediments to benefits in the area between the indifference curve
of the burdened eligible individuals and the indifference curve of
the ineligible individuals would be attractive to all eligible
The
individuals and unattractive to ineligible individuals.
at
point
combination
the
includes
problem is that this area, which
(IB,b), may be too small for a practical design of welfare programs.
Figure 4 also illustrates that there is a set of combinations of
benefits and impediments to benefits that is attractive only to
average and advantaged eligible individuals and a set that is
attractive only to advantaged eligible individuals. The former set
is defined by the area between the indifference curves of the
burdened and average eligible individuals and includes the
combination at point (jB,b). The latter set is defined by the area
between the indifference curves of the average and advantaged
eligible individuals and include the combination at point (lB, b).
2.

Interpretation of Heterogeneity

Heterogeneity of eligible individuals that establishes
differences in the value of offered benefits may relate to various
characteristics. First, impediments to benefits are likely to burden
disproportionately those eligible individuals with short-term
expected eligibility spells as well as those eligible for relatively
modest benefits and those with relatively modest needs.
Empirically, such burdened eligible individuals, nearly-ineligible
individuals, are the least likely to apply for welfare benefits.96 In
this group of nearly-ineligible individuals one could also include
96. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
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those individuals who forgo in-kind benefits and subsidized goods
in favor of high-quality market alternatives.97
Second,
impediments to benefits relating to frequency of encounters with
welfare bureaucracies are particularly costly for working eligible
individuals. Indeed, evidence shows that such burdened eligible
individuals, working eligible individuals, are the most likely to
drop out of the application process before their eligibility is
determined." Third, the costs of impediments to benefits may be
particularly high for eligible individuals with specific limitations
and disadvantages, such as uneducated persons and immigrants.
For example, during the 1970s many Cuban refugees faced high
bureaucratic barriers to welfare, because they could not produce
appropriately certified copies of birth certificates.99 More recently,
a study of susceptibility to diversion policies shows that such
policies are effective especially among applicants at the low end of
the educational spectrum and among Hispanic families."' Many
other studies find that less educated and more disadvantaged
eligible individuals face particularly high barriers to compliance
with welfare requirements. 1° Evidence also shows that extremely
poor individuals face difficulties in reaching welfare centers
because of transportation costs.'
These burdened eligible
individuals, the more disadvantagedeligible individuals,are likely
to need benefits more than other eligible individuals.' °3 By
97. See supra Part I.A.3.
98. SUSAN BARTLETT ET AL., THE FOOD STAMP APPLICATION PROCESS: OFFICE
OPERATIONS AND CLIENT EXPERIENCES (1992); LOREN BELL ET AL., REENGINEERING THE WELFARE SYSTEM: A STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES TO

THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., 27 (2002), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/fanrr17/.
99. William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy,and Class in the Welfare System,
92 YALE L.J. 1198, 1198 (1983).
100. London, supra note 93 (concluding that, in addition to these groups,
applicants at the high end of the educational spectrum are also sensitive to
diversion policies).
101. See, e.g., LaDonna Pavetti & Dan Bloom, State Sanctions and Time Limits,
in THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE, supra note 37, at 245, 259-60 (surveying studies
of the characteristics of sanctioned TANF recipients and noting that sanctioned
recipients are drawn disproportionately from the more disadvantaged portions of
the caseload); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WELFARE REFORM: STATE SANCTION
POLICIES AND NUMBER OF FAMILIES AFFECTED 33-34 (2000) (noting that sanctioned

TANF recipients are less educated or face more barriers to compliance).
102. See, e.g., HEIDI GOLDBERG, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, STATE
AND COUNTY SUPPORTED CAR OWNERSHIP PROGRAMS CAN HELP LOW-INCOME
FAMILIES SECURE AND KEEP JOBS (2001), available at http://www.cbpp.org/11-801wel.pdf. Total average out-of-pocket costs food-stamp applicants incurred have
been estimated at $10.31 and $5.84 for recertification. These costs include
primarily transportation. PONZA ET AL., supra 44, at 45-47.
103. The Food Stamp Act instructs state agencies to establish procedures for the

2006]

UNWELCOME BENEFITS

contrast, advantaged eligible individuals are likely to be relatively
sophisticated persons, whose costs of learning about welfare
programs and conforming to application procedures are low.0 4
Another cause of disparities in participation costs of eligible
individuals is the impact of self-esteem that varies across
individuals. This factor is addressed below.0 5
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that burdened eligible
individuals are likely to be those at the poles of the distribution of
eligible individuals. The less disadvantaged eligible individuals
tend to be burdened by impediments to benefits because of their
relatively small benefits and their opportunity costs. The more
disadvantaged eligible individuals tend to be burdened because of
personal limitations and transportation costs. The described form
of polarized participation patterns, however, does not suggest that
the groups of burdened eligible individuals at the poles are similar
in size or density (the percentage of burdened individuals in a
group). Empirical studies consistently indicate that most of the
nonparticipants are among the less economically disadvantaged
individuals and among the less needy individuals." 6
The
important point is the understanding that not all nonparticipants
are alike and that, in the many cases of forgone small benefits,
nonparticipation is not so troubling. Troubling nonparticipation is
that of eligible individuals who forgo large benefits and of eligible
individuals, such as working eligible individuals, whose attempts
to conform to norms of self-sufficiency raise their participation
costs.
II. Information and Self-Esteem Costs
The discussion thus far has focused on general costs of
impediments to benefits.
This Part addresses specific nonmonetary costs of impediments to benefits. Two groups of nonmonetary costs are discussed: information and learning costs and
self-esteem related costs. There are other forms of non-monetary
costs that are not discussed in this Article. Such examples include
operation of food stamp offices to provide timely, accurate, and fair service to all
applicants, including those with high costs, such as households with elderly or
disabled members, households in rural areas, homeless individuals, and households
in areas in which a substantial number of low-income speak a language other than
English. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(2).
104. Part II.A elaborates further on heterogeneity issues related to mental
capacity.
105. See infra Part II.B.
106. See, e.g., Blank & Ruggles, supra note 17; Daponte et al., supra note 51;
Haider et al., supra note 53.
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favors from and indebtedness to third parties, such as a flexible
employer, a babysitting neighbor, or a friend who owns a car.
These forms of non-monetary costs can be converted to monetary
costs of the types discussed above, such as opportunity and
transportation costs. The non-monetary costs addressed in this
Section are unique in their varying impact across eligible
individuals and in their potential positive effect on actual and
perceived monetary costs relating to participation in welfare
programs. For example, information problems are often related to
mental capacity and social functioning and, therefore, may be
higher for eligible individuals who are intellectually and socially
more disadvantaged than other eligible individuals. Similarly,
self-esteem levels vary across individuals and tend to relate to
actual and perceived costs involved in applying for and using
0 7
welfare benefits when individuals try to hide welfare receipt.
Such differences among eligible individuals are likely to result in
peculiar participation patterns that are presented in this Part.
A. Information and Learning Costs
A successful application for a welfare program requires
information about the program's availability, eligibility criteria,
and application procedures.'
Obtaining and processing these
types of information entail costs that vary across eligible
individuals according to their mental capacity and environment.
Empirical evidence indicates that disparities in mental capacityone's ability to collect information, understand the obtained
information, and realistically discount the future-influence
participation in welfare programs. For example, several studies
find that considerable numbers of TANF recipients face difficulties
in understanding communicated information regarding the
Many TANF recipients also overly
program requirements.'

107. See, e.g., PONZA ET AL., supra note 44, at 47-49 (finding that fifteen percent
of surveyed Food Stamp recipients had tried at some time to hide the fact that they
were receiving food stamps and that ten percent of surveyed Food Stamp recipients
went out of their way to shop at a store where nobody knew them to avoid having
someone they knew see them using food stamps).
108. Daponte et al., supra note 51 (finding that informing people about their
eligibility for food stamps increased the probability of participation, although one
might have assumed that all individuals know about the Food Stamp Program).
109. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERV., TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES: EDUCATING CLIENTS ABOUT
SANCTIONS (1999) (finding that TANF recipients do not fully understand
communicated information regarding TANF requirements and sanctions); Pavetti
& Bloom, supra note 101, at 256-58 (reviewing existing evidence on communication
processing among TANF recipients).
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discount the future, as they are not responsive to the cashassistance time limits1 ' and do not take sanctions seriously until
they are imposed.' 1 ' The individual's environment is another
factor in her information costs because information transmitted
through social networks affects the likelihood of knowing about a
program" ' and, to a lesser extent, affects the likelihood of
understanding eligibility criteria and application procedures as
the latter factors are intricate and personalized."3
Put simply, intellectual and social disadvantages are likely to
be related to information and learning costs, so that the more
disadvantaged individuals incur particularly high costs.

110. PRWORA imposes a five-year time limit on TANF cash assistance. 42
U.S.C. § 608(a)(7). It has been estimated that time limits account for sixteen to
eighteen percent of the recent caseload decline and that a significant number of
eligible households "bank" rights. Yet, evidence shows that many TANF recipients
are myopic with respect to time limits; hence, time limits affect their exit likelihood
as they approach the time limit. For the responsiveness of TANF recipients to the
time limits, see Robert A. Moffitt & LaDonna A. Pavetti, Time Limits, in FINDING
JOBS: WORK AND WELFARE REFORM 507, 510-15 (David Card & Rebecca M. Blank
eds., 2000); Pavetti & Bloom, supra note 101, at 256-58; Jeffrey Grogger, Time
Limits and Welfare Use, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 405 (2004) [hereinafter Time
Limits and Welfare Use]; Jeffrey Grogger, The Behavioral Effects of Welfare Time
Limits, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 385 (2002) [hereinafter Behavioral Effects]. Similar
behavioral patterns have been found among unemployment insurance recipients,
whose rate of exit from the unemployment insurance program rises as the spell
proceeds.
See, e.g., Robert A. Moffitt, Unemployment Insurance and the
Distribution of Unemployment Spells, 28 J. ECONOMETRICS 85 (1985) (finding that
reservation wages fall as the unemployment proceeds).
111. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supranote 109, at 13.
112. See generally Marianne Bertrand et al., Network Effects and Welfare
Cultures, 115 Q.J. ECON. 1019 (2000) (examining language use within a network
formation); George J. Borjas & Lynette Hilton, Immigration and the Welfare State:
Immigrant Participationin Means-Tested Entitlement Programs, 111 Q.J. ECON.
575 (1996) (finding that the types of benefits received by early immigrants
influence the types of benefits received by newly arrived immigrants); Mark R.
Rank & Thomas A. Hirschl, The Link Between Population Density and Welfare
Participation,30 DEMOGRAPHY 607 (1993) (finding that population density has a
strong, positive impact on the likelihood of participating in FSP and that
population density is positively correlated to accurate information on FSP and
positive attitude toward the use of welfare).
113. Even when eligible individuals are aware of welfare programs, they may
believe they are ineligible and, consequently, may not apply. See, e.g., Coe, supra
note 17, at 1039 (finding that among food-stamp eligible nonparticipants forty
percent did not think they were entitled to benefits); PONZA ET AL., supra note 44
(finding that among surveyed food-stamp eligible nonparticipants approximately
seventy-five percent did not think they were entitled to benefits, even though many
of them had prior exposure to the program). Moreover, loss of eligibility for one
class of benefits often leads to the belief that eligibility to other classes of benefits is
also lost. See, e.g., Everett Peterson & Jeffrey Alwang, Determinants of Food Stamp
Program Exits, 75 Soc. SERV. REV. 539 (2001) (finding that many TANF leavers
did not participate in the Food Stamp Program after leaving TANF, even though
they still qualified for food stamps).
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B. Self-Esteem
This Part examines the impact of self-esteem on participation
in welfare programs. Part II.B.1 briefly explains the meaning of
the term "self-esteem" in the context of participation in welfare
programs. Part II.B.2 presents the impact of self-esteem on
participation in welfare programs and participation patterns
related to self-esteem. Part II.B.3 explains why self-esteem plays
a significant role in decisions not to participate in welfare
programs.
1.

What Is Self-Esteem?

In the United States, public preferences for welfare programs
vary across programs."' While there is wide support for earned
benefits, investments in human capital, and benefits for perceived
responsible eligible individuals, there is general public resentment
toward benefits for perceived irresponsible individuals. These
preferences are implied from public support for spending increases
to benefits for the elderly, health care,"5 education, and childcare,
while the public simultaneously supports spending cuts to benefits
for unemployed people, food stamps, and cash assistance for the
poor."' Among the unpopular benefits, welfare benefits for the
poor are the most disliked, and this strong preference is embedded
in PRWORA's language." 7 Negative perceptions of welfare tend to
114. See generally MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERIcANS HATE WELFARE 27-30
(1999).
115. Public support for spending increases for Medicare that targets the elderly
and disabled is significantly higher than public support for spending increases for
Medicaid that targets low-income individuals. Id. at 28.
116. Id. (summarizing public surveys). See also BECKER, supra note 9, at 19
("Welfare discourages the independence and self-reliance of recipients, while social
security weakens the ties that bind together older parents and their children...
and encourages retired people to believe they deserve government support.")
117. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 601; Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193 (5)-(7) (1996):
The number of individuals receiving [AFDC] has more than tripled since
1965.... Eighty-nine percent of children receiving AFDC benefits now live
in homes in which no father is present .... While the number of children
receiving AFDC benefits increased nearly threefold between 1965 and
1992, the total number of children in the United States aged 0 to 18 has
declined by 5.5 percent.... The total of all out-of-wedlock births between
1970 and 1991 has risen from 10.7 percent to 29.5 percent and if the current trend continues, 50 percent of all births by the year 2015 will be outof-wedlock.... It is estimated that in the late 1980's, the rate for girls age
14 and under giving birth increased 26 percent.... Data indicates that at
least half of the children born to teenage mothers are fathered by adult
men.... Surveys of teen mothers have revealed that a majority of such
mothers have histories of sexual and physical abuse, primarily with older
adult men.
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cost welfare applicants and recipients in their self-esteem and
discourage some of them from participating in unpopular
programs." 8
Self-esteem, in this Article, refers to social status, a person's
rank in a hierarchy, and self-conscious emotions, such as shame,
guilt, and pride. The private costs of the pursuit of status are
generally attributed to investments that may improve one's image
among other people. 19 As set out below, forgone welfare benefits
often constitute investments in status. Unlike the pursuit of
status that is all about interactions with others, self-conscious
emotions reflect internalization of common social perspectives. 120
Such internalization, in turn, means that even unobservable
actions, such as money transfers, may entail some psychological
costs.
In practice, it is difficult to distinguish between status-driven
motivations and self-consciousness-driven motivations, because
they interact with each other. In many cases, because selfconsciousness emotions are an internalization of the same forces
that shape status pursuits, self-consciousness emotions operate as

118. See, e.g., ZEDLEWSKI ET AL., supra note 49 (interviewing ninety-five
extremely poor families living without employment or government cash assistance
and finding that twenty-three percent of eligible nonparticipants in a sample of
extremely poor families are staying away from welfare programs because of pride).
See also Super, supra note 16, 640-42 (noting one's self-assurance of her rights to
welfare benefits may be enhanced or diminished by legislative and administrative
choices, as well as public rhetoric).
119. For a comprehensive study of various aspects of the pursuit of status, see
ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST
FOR STATUS (1985).
120. See generally SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SHAME,
GUILT, EMBARRASSMENT, AND PRIDE (June Price Tangney & Kurt W. Fischer eds.,
1995); Patrick M. Horan & Patricia Lee Austin, The Social Bases of Welfare
Stigma, 21 SOC. PROBS. 648 (1974); Harold R. Kerbo, The Stigma of Welfare and
the Passive Poor, 60 SOC. & SOC. RES. 173 (1976); see also ERVING GOFFMAN,
STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 8-9 (1963) ("Those who
have dealings with [the stigmatized individual] fail to accord him the respect and
regard... [and] have led him to anticipate receiving [disrespect and disregard]; he
echoes this denial [of respect and regard) by finding that some of his own attributes
warrant it"); Walter R. Gove, Societal Reaction as an Explanationof Mental Illness:
An Evaluation,35 AM. SOC. REV. 873, 875 (1970):
Once a person is stigmatized by being labeled a deviant, a self-fulfilling
prophecy is initiated with others perceiving and responding to the person
as a deviant. Furthermore, once persons are publicly processed as deviants, they are typically forced into a deviant group . .. . '[Miembership in
such a group solidifies a deviant identity' and leads to rationalization of
their position.
(quoting HOWARD BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 38
(1963)).
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a multiplier of a pursuit of status. 12 ' For example, pride and a
pursuit of status may motivate a person to refrain from
participating in welfare programs.
In such situations, the
multiplier of self-conscious emotions is greater than one, since
such emotions increase status-driven motivations. By contrast,
the internalization of shame may also operate in the opposite
122
direction, when the shamed person loses belief in her abilities.
In such circumstances, the multiplier is smaller than one, since
the internalization of welfare perceptions decreases motivations to
leave welfare.
2.

The Impact of Self-Esteem on Welfare Participation

a. Pursuits of Status
Investments in status are generally explained by the
observation that "the usual basis of self-respect is the respect
Status studies focus on the
accorded by one's neighbors."" '

121. See, e.g., Bruce G. Link et al., On Stigma and Its Consequences: Evidence
from a Longitudinal Study of Men with Dual Diagnoses of Mental Illness and
Substance Abuse, 38 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 177 (1997); Sarah Rosenfield,
Labeling Mental Illness: The Effects of Received Services and Perceived Stigma on
Life Satisfaction, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 660 (1997) (finding that internalization of
status through labeling may lead to both positive and negative effects among the
mentally ill).
122. See, e.g., Amerigo Farina et al., Mental Illness and the Impact of Believing
Others Know It, 77 J. ABNORMAL PSYCH. 1 (1971) (finding that internalization of
stigma negatively affects social interactions); Monica J. Harris, Self-Fulfilling
Effects of Stigmatizing Information on Children's Social Interactions, 63 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 41 (1992); Mark Sibicky & John F. Dovidio, Stigma
of Psychological Therapy: Stereotypes, Interpersonal Reactions, and the SelfFulfilling Prophecy, 33 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 148 (1986).
123. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 30 (1899). For
prominent works on the pursuit of status, see JAMES S. DUESENBERRY, INCOME,
SAVING AND THE THEORY OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOR (1949); FRANK, supra note 119;
GOFFMAN, supra note 120; FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH (1976); JERRY
M. SULS & LADD WHEELER EDS., HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COMPARISON: THEORY AND
PRACTICE (2000); Leon Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison Processes, 7 HUM.
REL. 117 (1954); Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1 (1992);
Yew-Kwang Ng, Economic Growth and Social Welfare: The Need for a Complete
Study of Happiness, 31 KYKLOS 575 (1978); Thomas F. Pettigrew, Social Evaluation
Theory: Convergences and Applications, in NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION
241 (D. Levine ed., 1967); Robert A. Pollak, Interdependent Preferences, 66 AM.
ECON. REV. 309 (1976); See also ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS
50-51 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 1979) (1759):
The rich man glories in his riches, because he feels that they naturally
draw upon him the attention of the world.... The poor man ... feels that
[his poverty] either places him out of the sight of mankind, or, that if they
take any notice of him, they have ... scarce any fellow feeling with the
misery and distress which he suffers.
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interdependence of individuals' preferences, 2 4 assuming that each
person seeks as an end a position that is relatively superior to that
held by others in her reference group. For that end, individuals
regularly engage in interpersonal comparisons, assuming that
such comparisons would enhance their self-esteem, assist in
identifying their comparative advantage, and facilitate informed
capital.1 2'
human
in
investments
regarding
decisions
Interpersonal comparisons, however, often lead to distortions in
personal investments:
individuals tend to over-invest in
observable goods-goods that are consumed in public view-at the
expense of investments in unobservable goods, although the latter
may be more important than the former in the long run. 126 For
example, interpersonal comparisons explain overinvestment in
luxury goods, which have no intrinsic value, and underinvestment
in health and fitness, which have intrinsic value but might not
improve one's status in the short run. Observable goods that are
sought because they can provide a favorable basis for comparison
with others, rather than because of an absolute property they
possess, are commonly known in the literature as positional
goods."7
Welfare participation is often observable by third parties.
Employers may be asked to provide information about welfare
claimants' income and number of work hours,1 2 8 store clerks and

124. A fundamental premise of the neo-classic economics was that individuals'
preferences are independent and each individual strives to maximize her own
utility regardless of other people's circumstances. See FRANK, supra note 119, at 3334.
125. Stan Morse & Kenneth J. Gergen, Social Comparison,Self-Consistency, and
the Concept of Self, 16 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 148 (1970); Thomas A.
Wills, Downward Comparison Principles in Social Psychology, 90 PSYCHOL. BULL.
245 (1981).
126. See Robert H. Frank, The Demand for Unobservable and Other
Nonpositional Goods, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 101, 102-06 (1985); Robert H. Frank,
Frames of Reference and the Quality of Life, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 80 (1989);
GOFFMAN, supra note 120, at 41-104; Elias L. Khalil, Symbolic Products: Prestige,
Pride, and Identity Goods, 49 THEORY & DECISION 53 (2000); see also SMITH, supra
note 123, at 50 ("[B]ecause mankind are disposed to sympathize more entirely with
our joy than with our sorrow.., we make parade of our riches and conceal our
poverty.").
127. The term was coined by Fred Hirsch in SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH (1976).
128. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2015(o)(2) (limiting the eligibility of childless adults for
food stamps to three months in each 36-month period, unless they are working at
least 20 hours per week); 7 U.S.C. § 2015(o)(5) (providing that an individual whose
eligibility for food stamps was denied because she did not meet the basic work
requirements, may regain eligibility if during a thirty-day period she works eighty
hours or more); 42 U.S.C. § 607(c) (defining engagement in work, for the purpose of
TANF work requirements, as participation in work activities for at least twenty
hours per week).
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shoppers observe the use of food stamps,' health care providers
know whether patients use private insurance or Medicaid, and so
forth. Accordingly, observable benefits may constitute negative
positional goods, goods that convey social information that
stigmatizes the benefit recipient and lowers her social rank. 0 The
stigma that arises from negative positional goods may also create
1 2
negative social attitudes' toward, and statistical discrimination '
against, welfare recipients. For example, sellers often treat foodstamp recipients disrespectfully, 133 landlords frequently engage in
statistical discrimination against welfare recipients because of the
financial risk they pose," and health care providers are believed

129. PRWORA required all states to replace the traditional food stamps with
Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) cards no later than October 1, 2002. 7 U.S.C. §
2016. EBT are similar to debit cards but are still recognizable. For visual
examples
of
various
state
EBT
cards,
see
http://images.ark.orgdhs/ebt/images/wpeC8.jpg
(Arkansas
EBT
card);
http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/ebt/docs/Appendix_ F FL EBTCardDesign.pdf
(the
Florida
EBT
Card);
http'//www.gettingfoodstamps.org/ebtcard.htm
(the
Massachusetts EBT card); http://www.state.sc.us/dss/news/20040602.html (the
South Carolina EBT card); http://www.state.sd.us/social/EBT/STOFR.htm (the
South Dakota EBT card).
130. See GOFFMAN, supra note 120, at 2-3 (explaining that stigma is the social
information that an individual directly conveys about himself: it is "an attribute
that makes [the individual] different from others in the category of persons
available for him to be ... especially when its discrediting effect is very extensive").
131. See generally Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, Understanding Welfare
Stigma: Taxpayer Resentment and StatisticalDiscrimination,48 J. PUB. ECON. 165
(1992); PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 69, at 165:
Market values and market incentives are weakest at the bottom of the social order. To buttress weak market controls and to ensure the availability
of marginal labor, an outcast class-the dependent poor-is created by the
relief system. This class, whose members are of no productive use, is not
treated with indifference, but with contempt. Its degradation at the hands
of relief officials serves to celebrate the virtue of all work, and deters actual or potential workers from seeking aid.
132. See, e.g., GOFFMAN, supra note 120, at 5 (discussing societal reactions to a
stigmatized person as "varieties of discrimination" that effectively "reduce his life
chances"); Bernard Weiner et al., An AttributionalAnalysis of Reactions to Stigmas,
55 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 738 (1988).
133. See, e.g., PONZA ET AL., supra note 44, at 48 (reporting that 22.8% of food
stamp program participants have been treated disrespectfully when using food
stamps in a store, primarily by store clerks).
134. See Paula Beck, Fighting Section 8 Discrimination:The FairHousing Act's
New Frontier,31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155 (1996); Kim Johnson-Spratt, Housing
Discriminationand Source of Income: A Tenant's Losing Battle, 32 IND. L. REV. 457
(1999); James A. Kushner, The Fair HousingAmendments Act of 1988: The Second
Generationof FairHousing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1105-06 (1989) (discussing the
prevalence of the practice and noting that many states and localities have
specifically prohibited rental practices that consider the source of applicants'
income and have particularly proscribed discrimination against welfare recipients).
Several courts held that landlords who refuse applications from all tenants who
receive welfare benefits violate the Fair Housing Act; see, e.g., Gilligan v. Jamco
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to provide low-quality services to Medicaid patients.'35

The potential negative positional consequences of welfare
participation are similar to the generic impediments to benefits
discussed earlier and are, in effect, another form of private
participation costs. Status-related costs vary across individuals
and may crowd out some eligible individuals. Eligible individuals
who feel stigmatized may swallow their pride, try to hide the fact
that they receive welfare benefits, 36 or avoid applying for
benefits.'37 Thus, pride swallowing and attempts to conceal
welfare receipt are merely additional private costs of enrolling in
welfare programs.
b. Self-Consciousness
Self-conscious emotions may operate in a manner similar to
status pursuits. Some emotions, like pride and expected shame,
impose psychic costs that reduce the value of welfare benefits,
thereby discouraging some eligible individuals from participating
in welfare programs. Yet, internalized shame may operate in the
opposite direction. Shamed welfare participants may lose hope of
earning economic independence'38 and, therefore, perceive welfare
benefits as a necessity. The major cost of the welfare stigma for
such individuals is the loss of hope.
c.

Self-Esteem and Heterogeneity of Eligible Individuals

As noted, the effects of status pursuits and self-consciousness
vary across eligible individuals. Such non-uniform effects stem

Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246 (9th Cir. 1997).
135. Janet Currie et al., Physician Payments and Infant Mortality: Evidence
from Medicaid Fee Policy, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 106 (1995); Frank Sloan et al.,
Physician Participationin State Medicaid Programs, 13 J. HUM. RESOURCES 211
(1978); Stuber & Kronebusch, supra note 49.
136. See, e.g., PONZA ET AL., supra note 44, at 47-49 (reporting that ten percent of
surveyed food-stamp recipients said that they went out of their way to shop at a
store where nobody knew them, fifteen percent said that they had tried at some
time to hide the fact they were receiving food stamps and twenty-two percent
indicated that they had avoided telling other people about their receipt of food
stamps).
137. See, e.g., Moffitt, supra note 8 (finding a negative correlation between
welfare stigma and participation in the AFDC program); ZEDLEWSKI ET AL., supra
note 49 (finding that twenty-three percent of eligible nonparticipants in a sample of
extremely poor families are staying away from welfare programs because of pride);
see also PONZA ET AL., supra note 44, at 48, 58, 66-70 (reporting that stigma plays a
role in decisions not to apply to food stamp programs, but only 0.2 percent of food
stamp recipients do not use them because of stigma concerns).
138. See, e.g., Farina et al., supra note 122; Sibicky & John F. Dovidio, supra
note 122.
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from differences in ego, status preferences, and experiences with
the welfare system. For example, welfare stigma perceptions
relating to specific welfare benefits were found significantly
stronger among eligible and nearly-eligible individuals who never
used these benefits than among those who used the benefits." 9
Empirical evidence also suggests that welfare stigma may be
endogenous, since those who least need benefits and are eligible
for small benefits are more likely to feel there is stigma associated
with welfare. 4 °
Differences in self-esteem of eligible individuals may
establish peculiar participation patterns among eligible
individuals. Private costs of self-esteem tend to be high for proud
eligible individuals, those individuals who strive to conform to
social norms of self-sufficiency and are affected by pride and
potential shame. As a result, such individuals are more likely to
forgo welfare benefits. In contrast, shameless eligible individuals,
those who are less sensitive to status and less self-conscious, are
more likely to depend on welfare.'
Similarly, shamed eligible
individuals, those who have lost hope to get ahead on their own,
are also prone to depend on welfare.
The social implications of these participation patterns are
ambiguous.
On the one hand, status pursuits and selfconsciousness motivate some eligible individuals to get ahead on
their own. On the other hand, these motivations may be too
strong and unrelated to personal skills and general economic
conditions.
Public assistance to disadvantaged individuals,
especially in the forms of nutrition and medical services, may
139. See, e.g., PONZA ET

., supra note 4, at 66-70 tbl. IV.6:
Participants Nonparticipants Nonparticipants
Who
Received Who Never Received
Food Stamps
Food Stamps
10.5%
12.0%
24.7%

Have been or perceive
they would be perceived
disrespectfully if found to
be receiving food stamps
Have shopped or would 10.3%
12.7%
26.0%
shop at a store where no
one knows them
Have avoided or would 22.4%
18.4%
33.4%
avoid telling people they
receive food stamps
See also Stuber & Kronebusch, supra note 49, at 519-24 (2004) (finding similar
biases among individuals eligible for TANF and Medicaid).
140. PONZA ET AL., supra note 44, at 35.
141. For a theoretical treatment, see B. Douglas Bernheim, A Theory of
Conformity, 102 J. POL. ECON. 841 (1994).
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improve their potential growth and be socially desirable. In
addition, self-esteem may operate in opposition to the foregoing
motivations and suffocate hopes to leave welfare and entail some
deadweight loss since proud and shamed benefit recipients
discount the monetary value of received benefits."'
The
distribution of these forces in the relevant population is unknown
and probably can only be speculated.'
3.

The Significance of Self-Esteem

Relatively small percentages of eligible individuals cite
welfare stigma as a major cause of nonparticipation. 4 4 However,
such replies to direct questions are not necessarily indicative of
their accuracy, since one cannot assume that eligible individuals
know the reasons for their actions and actually cite them. For
example, an expressed desire for personal independence is
probably closely related to concerns of welfare stigma.14 ' A careful
examination of surveys among eligible individuals, however,
suggests that the weight of self-esteem in participation decisions is
much greater than
appears in replies of eligible individuals to
146
direct questions.

142. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
143. See Robert Solow, Guess Who Likes Welfare, in ROBERT SOLOW, WORK AND
WELFARE 3, 18-19 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998):
In the presence of a social norm of self-reliance, people will sort themselves
out between those who work and pay taxes, and those who do not work and
receive benefits. The number of welfare recipients will depend on the size
of the benefit, the frequency distribution of earning power, and the
strength of the drive to earn one's own living.... It is no doubt more likely
that some people feel [the norm of self-reliance] more intensely than others.... Since no one actually knows anything about [the frequency distribution of the norm], the complication [of the analysis] does not seem
worthwhile.
144. See, e.g., Coe, supra note 17 (reporting that sixteen percent of food-stamp
nonparticipating households cited welfare stigma as a major cause of
nonparticipation); PONZA ET AL., supra note 44 (reporting that seven percent of
food-stamp nonparticipating households cited welfare stigma as a major cause of
nonparticipation).
Robert Moffitt was the first to provide an econometric
estimation of "stigma" in participation decisions. His estimation, however, did not
distinguish between self-esteem and other impediments to benefits, monetary and
non-monetary. Moffitt, supra note 8; see also, Currie, supra note 7, at 27
(surveying the literature on participation in welfare programs and concluding that
although stigma may affect participation, "other, more concrete types of
transactions costs are probably a good deal more important").
145. ELIGIBLE NONPARTICIPANTS, supra note 59, at 26 (reporting that ninety-one
percent of surveyed households not inclined to apply for food stamps cite the desire
for personal independence as a nonparticipation reason and that forty-four percent
of the same surveyed group cite stigma as a reason).
146. For the difficulties in assessing the significance of Medicaid stigma, see
Arik Levinson & Sjamsu Rhardja, Medicaid Stigma (July 2004) (unpublished
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For example, very high percentages of nonparticipating
eligible individuals cite unawareness of eligibility as a prime cause
of nonparticipation, 147 but at the same time many of these
individuals argue that they would not apply for benefits even if
they found out that they were eligible because of the desire for
Moreover, welfare recipients with
personal independence.
characteristics similar to those of surveyed nonparticipants said
that they applied for benefits primarily because of changes in
economic needs and only an insignificant portion of them applied
for benefits because they became aware of eligibility or their
participation costs went down. 14 9 Since the surveyed participants
and nonparticipants had similar characteristics, it is reasonable to
assume that the actual disparities between these groups in
participation information costs are not great enough to explain
differences in participation decisions."' The latter interpretation
is supported by empirical studies that show that "knowledge about
programs is somewhat endogenous, as households generally avail
themselves of information about [programs] when the anticipated
benefits of doing so are large.""' This interpretation is also
consistent with replies of surveyed eligible individuals to questions
regarding welfare stigma: nonparticipants, and especially those
who have never received welfare benefits, are more sensitive to

manuscript, on file with the author).
147. PONZA ET AL., supra note 44, at 56-58 (reporting that 71.7% of the foodstamp eligible nonparticipants said that they were not aware that they might be
eligible); ELIGIBLE NONPARTICIPANTS, supra note 59, at 24 (reporting that fiftythree percent of surveyed nonparticipants thought they were ineligible or were not
sure about their eligibility).
148. ELIGIBLE NONPARTICIPANTS, supra note 59 (reporting that approximately
thirty percent of surveyed nonparticipants said they would not apply for food
stamps even if they knew they were eligible and that ninety-one percent of these
nonparticipants are motivated primarily by the desire for self-sufficiency).
149. PONZA ET AL., supra note 44, at 41 (reporting that 2.5% of food stamp
recipients reported that the most important reason that led them to apply for food
stamp was awareness of eligibility, while 86.5%of food stamp recipients reported
that the major reason for applying for food stamps was a change in economic needs
such as a change in size of household or a household member losing employment);
see also Blank & Ruggles, supra note 17 (finding that among women eligible for
participation in the AFDC and Food Stamp programs, those with the greatest longterm need, and whose alternative earning opportunities are limited, are more likely
to participate than other eligible women, and that most women who join the AFDC
and Food Stamp programs do so within a few months of becoming eligible).
150. See also Blank & Ruggles, supra note 17, at 58 (finding that seventy-one
percent of AFDC participation spells start at the beginning of the eligibility spell
and that women who become AFDC eligible and do not start receiving it almost
immediately are much more likely to leave eligibility than to enter the program).
151. See, e.g., Daponte et al., supra note 51, at 612 (abstract).
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stigma than participants are.152
III. Legal and Policy Implications
This Part applies the conclusions of the foregoing analysis to
Part III.A
address several legal and policy implications.
rates
participation
reemphasizes the misleading nature of general
and the need to focus on the more disadvantaged individuals. Part
III.B suggests several simple administrative means that could
lower participation costs and increase participation rates. Part
III.C outlines general principles that should guide the design of
eligibility criteria and corresponding benefit levels and benefit
forms. Part III.D addresses PRWORA's work requirements and
their effects on the more disadvantaged individuals, and suggests
how to mitigate these distortions. Part III.E argues that the time
limits imposed by PRWORA are unfavorable especially for the
their
questions
and
individuals
disadvantaged
more
reasonableness.
A. FocusingAttention on the More Disadvantaged
Individuals
although
that
illustrated
Parts
foregoing
The
nonparticipation in welfare programs poses a real problem, the
little.
very
means
itself
in
"nonparticipation"
term
Nonparticipation of the less disadvantaged individuals is generally
explained by the offering of practically too small benefits, while
nonparticipation of the more disadvantaged individuals is
explained by significant impediments to benefits. In the economic
literature and the public discourse, often there are voices that
153
refer to nonparticipation as a "choice" of eligible individuals.
There is something misleading in this approach: those who are
unfamiliar with the facts assume that real benefits are offered, but
costly benefits offer no additional choices to eligible persons."'
Moreover, since the welfare budget is limited, the question is why
practically too small benefits are offered in the first place, rather
152. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
153. For a comprehensive analysis of this approach, see Super, supra note 8.
154. See id., at 818:
[Following PRWORA,] [plersonal choice-and its manipulation have replaced formal rules as the dominant theme in public benefits law.
Under this model, states have sought to restructure both their formal
and informal rationing systems so that a claimant's failure to receive benefits can be attributed to the claimant's own choices rather than to those of
the state.
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than using this portion of the budget to increase the benefits of the
more disadvantaged individuals.' 55
As noted above, 56 because of the income-need effect, most
nonparticipants tend to belong to the group of the less
disadvantaged individuals. Yet, several impediments to benefits
also disproportionately
burden
the more disadvantaged
individuals. Nonparticipation of such individuals raises serious
concerns and attention should be focused on this group. General
participation rates do not differentiate between these groups,
thereby distracting attention away from the troubling problem of
the more disadvantaged individuals.
B. EliminatingNon-Screening Impediments to Benefits
Impediments to benefits that are unrelated to the screening
function of welfare bureaucracies, such as garden-variety ordeals,
constitute a pure deadweight loss. Eliminating such impediments
is socially desirable and is likely to increase participation among
eligible individuals. This Part proposes three general directions of
efficiency
improvements
to illustrate
that considerable
improvements may be attained without substantial bureaucratic
reforms.157
To start with, in light of TANF's work requirements, 158 the
operation hours of welfare centers during regular business hours
erect barriers to benefits for many working individuals who
attempt to conform to self-sufficiency norms."' Such barriers run
counter to the goal of motivating work activities among welfare
recipients:
some eligible individuals, who would otherwise
supplement their work income with welfare, may be forced to
choose between welfare and work. Thus, extending the operation
hours of welfare centers by adding or expanding weekend and
evening hours will decrease impediments to benefits that burden
working eligible individuals.' 6'
Information costs may be reduced with relatively simple

155. See supra Part I.C.
156. See supra Part I.D.2.
157. It is noteworthy that states invest considerable efforts to eliminate nonscreening impediments to benefits. See, e.g., BELL ET AL., supra note 98; DOROTHY
ROSENBAUM, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, IMPROVING ACCESS TO FOOD
STAMPS: NEW REPORTING OPTIONS CAN REDUCE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS AND
ERROR RATES (2000), available at http://www.cbpp.org/9-1-OOfs.pdf.
158. See infra Part III.C.
159. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
160. Several states have already extended the operation hours of their welfare
centers. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 98, at 27-29, 94-95.

2006]

UNWELCOME BENEFITS

means, such as toll-free lines, brochures, and campaigns.
Presently, there are no legal requirements to employ such means
and the Food Stamp Act even emphasizes that it is each state's
option to inform low-income households about the availability,
eligibility requirements, application procedures, and benefit
levels.16 1 The Food and Nutrition Service encourages states and
interest groups to employ outreach programs, 162 but states' choices
whether to invest in such programs are always subject to their
incentives to lower participation in welfare programs.'63
Participation costs may also be reduced through aligning
procedural eligibility rules of different programs that target the
same populations. For example, presently PRWORA allows states
to adopt a Simplified Food Stamp Program that aligns eligibility
rules for TANF and food stamps, so that TANF eligible households
may be automatically eligible for food stamps.'
Aligning
eligibility rules and unifying application procedures could cut the
fixed costs of learning about and applying for benefits, since one
learning and application process could serve a few programs.
C. Benefit Size, Benefit Framing,and Benefit Choice
As discussed throughout this Article, for most forms and
levels of private costs associated with welfare participation,
presumably there are corresponding benefit levels that could65
compensate for the incurred costs and encourage participation.
This suggests that, for a given budget dedicated to welfare
transfers, distributive improvements could be attained by
diverting the budget presently dedicated to practically too small
benefits for the less disadvantaged individuals to the more
disadvantaged individuals. Since there are more nearly ineligible
individuals who forgo small benefits than eligible individuals who

161. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(1) (2000). State agencies, however, are required to
advise food stamp applicants of certain rights. For example, they are expected to
advise applicants that they do not have to be interviewed before filing the
application and may file an incomplete application and advise applicants who
withdraw their applications of their right to reapply at any time subsequent to a
withdrawal. 7 C.F.R. §§ 273.2(c)(1), 273.2(c)(6) (2005).
162. See FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOOD STAMP
OUTREACH
(providing
information
on
USDA
outreach
programs),
http://www.fns.usda.gov/fsp/outreachdefault.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2005).
163. See supra Part I.C.
164. 7 U.S.C. § 2035 (2000).
165. See supra note 52 and accompanying text; supra Part I.D. As noted above,
empirical evidence shows that stigma and information costs are endogenous to a
certain degree and tend to be negatively related to benefit size. See supra notes
140, 151 and accompanying text.
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forgo large benefits, the benefit increase for the more
disadvantaged individuals is likely to be meaningful.
Furthermore, the propensity to take up welfare benefits is
generally related to need.'66 Nevertheless, backed by the Supreme
Court 6 7 and popular public views, 6 ' certain welfare programs offer
"categorically needy" people, such as the elderly, blind, and
disabled, more generous benefits than those offered to actually
needy. Such allocation rules may be constitutional and politically
rewarding, but socially they are less desirable than the opposite
allocation rules that link benefits to actual needs.
The monetary value of a benefit, however, is not the only
factor determining its value for the recipient.
A benefit's
observability and form may lower its value for some recipients.'69
This, in turn, suggests that benefit framing 70 and benefit choices
may raise benefit value for self-esteem sensitive individuals.
Applying this intuition, in 1992, the Food and Nutrition Service
promulgated regulations allowing issuance of food stamps through
electronic-benefits-transfer ("EBT") cards as an alternative for the
traditional paper food stamps. 7
PRWORA went further and
mandated that all states switch to EBT cards no later than
October, 2002."'
EBT cards function like debit cards and
presumably17 ' created hopes that this new framing of food stamps
would lower self-esteem related costs. In practice, EBT cards have
166. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
167. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 37 (1981) (finding that more
generous Medicaid income criteria for the "categorically needy" than those applied
to "medically needy"); see also Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154, 158 (1986);
Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569 (1982).
168. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
169. See supra Part II.B.2.
170. For inconsistent preferences over equivalent choices that are framed
differently, see Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and
the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453 (1981); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
RationalChoice and the Framingof Decisions, 59 J. BUS. 8251 (1986).
171. Food Stamp Program: Standards for Approval and Operation of Food Stamp
Electronic Benefit Transfer Systems, 57 Fed. Reg. 11,218 (Apr. 1, 1992) (codified at
7 C.F.R. §§ 272, 274, 276, 277, 278 (1993)); see also FED. ELEC. BENEFITS TRANSFER
TASK FORCE, FROM PAPER TO ELECTRONICS: CREATING A BENEFIT DELIVERY
SYSTEM THAT WORKS BETTER AND COSTS LESS (1994).
172. 7 U.S.C. § 2016(i) (2000). California was the last state to complete the
transition to EBT cards in June 2004. See Robert Pear, Electronic Cards Replace
Coupons for Food Stamps, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2004, at Al.
173. Empirical studies of the transition to EBT cards, submitted to the Food and
Nutrition Service two years before the PRWORA enactment, indicated the
transition in Maryland had entailed efficiency improvements but had not reduced
welfare stigma. See, e.g., NANCY COLE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., EVALUATION OF THE
EXPANDED EBT DEMONSTRATION IN MARYLAND: FOOD STORE ACCESS AND ITS
IMPACT ON SHOPPING BEHAVIOR OF FOOD STAMP HOUSEHOLDS (1997).
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not had a significant impact on stigma associated with food
assistance,'74 probably because the cards are very recognizable.' 75
A more successful framing of food assistance benefits is the state
campaigns that aim at changing the image of food stamps from
"welfare" to "nutrition assistance."76
Choices among forms of benefits may mitigate self-esteem
related costs, since some benefits are perceived to be more
legitimate than others and may even be culturally encouraged.
For example, tax benefits that are less observable than other
benefits, are rather welcome by individuals, and tend to minimize
the costs of redistribution. 17 Indeed, participation rates in tax
programs that directly benefit targeted individuals (such as the
Earned Income Tax Credit Program) are very high.17
The
drawback of substituting benefit forms is that, unlike in
substituting frames of a benefit, substituting and substituted
forms are not necessarily functionally equivalent. For example,

174. See, e.g., COLE, id.; Janet Currie & Jeffrey Grogger, Explaining Recent
Declines in Food Stamp ProgramParticipation(Feb. 2001) (UCLA Working Paper).
175. See supra note 129 (giving examples of EBT cards).
176. See, e.g., FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOOD STAMP
OUTREACH
(providing
information
on
USDA
outreach
programs)
http://www.fns.usda.gov/fsp/outreach/default.htm
(last visited Oct. 2, 2005)
(providing information on state and private outreach programs and federal support
for such programs); The Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-265, 118 Stat. 729 (amending the National School Lunch Act and
the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 to promote nutrition in food service for children);
see also Sheila R. Zedlewski & Kelly Rader, Recent Trends in Food Stamp
Participation: Have New Policies Made a Difference?, in ASSESSING NEW
FEDERALISM: NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICA'S FAMILIES (Urb. Inst., Prog. to Assess
Changing Soc. Policies, Series B, No. B-58, 2004) (finding that the campaigns
account for some of the recent increase in the participation in the Food Stamp
Program), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310995-B-58.pdf.
177. See supra note 36 (providing literature on redistribution).
178. David Neumark & William Wascher, Using the EITC to Help Poor Families:
New Evidence and a Comparison with the Minimum Wage, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 281
(2001); John K. Scholz, The Earned Income Tax Credit: Participation,Compliance,
and Anti Poverty Effectiveness, 47 NAT'L TAX J. 63 (1994) (estimating participation
rates in the EITC at eighty to eighty-six percent).
It is noteworthy that
participation rates in employment-subsidy programs that benefit employers of
targeted individuals are very low, arguably because such programs increase
welfare stigma as employees required to expose detailed information to employers.
See, e.g., Gary Burtless, Are Targeted Wage Subsidies Harmful? Evidence from a
Wage Voucher Experiment, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 105 (1985); Stacy DickertConlin & Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Employee-Based Versus Employer-Based Subsidies
to Low-Wage Workers: A Public Finance Perspective, in FINDING JOBS: WORK AND
WELFARE REFORM, supra note 110, at 262; Kevin Hollenbeck & Richard Willke, The
Employment and Earnings Impacts of the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (Upjohn Inst.
for Emp. Res., Working Paper No. 91-07, 1991); Dave M. O'Neill, Employment Tax
Credit Programs: The Effects of Socioeconomic Targeting Provisions, 17 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 449 (1982).
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replacing in-kind benefits with tax benefits or cash transfers
would allow recipients to use the benefits for purposes other than
the intended ones.
D. Work Requirements
Given the government's imperfect information about
individuals' income-generating capacity, a central problem in
designing welfare programs is how to minimize work
180
9
Relying on overwhelming public support,
disincentives.
PRWORA imposed work requirements on TANF recipients and
particularly stiff ones on childless adult food-stamp recipients. 8
States are allowed, at their option, to exempt from TANF work
requirements single parents caring for children younger than one
year old.'
No exceptions are made for people who are unable to
work due to lack of marketable skills, although barriers to work
are very prevalent among the poor.183 Similarly, no exceptions are
made for people who are unable to work due to general economic
conditions and, consequently, dependence on job availability
84
makes the poor particularly vulnerable to business cycles.
Furthermore, the minimum work rate requirements set by
PRWORA 8 5 distort states' incentives to invest in human capital of
TANF recipients: due to the minimum work rate requirements, in
implementing TANF plans, many states employ "work first"
policies that focus on immediate job placement, rather than on
education and job training.8 6 Empirical evidence indicates that
179. See, e.g., Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, The Design of Income
Maintenance Programmes, 62 REV. ECON. STUD. 187 (1995) (offering a theoretical
screening model that relies on workfare).
180. GILENS, supra note 114, at 184-87 (summarizing surveys on public views on
work requirements).
181. See supra Part II.B; supra note 128 (citing statistics that limit food stamp
eligibility to childless adults).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 607(b)(5) (2000).
183. See, e.g., Krista K. Olson & LaDonna Pavetti, URB. INST., PERSONAL AND
FAMILY CHALLENGES TO THE SUCCESSFuL TRANSITION FROM WELFARE TO WORK,
(1996) (reviewing fifteen major disparities in barriers to employment among AFDC
families); Sheila R. Zedlewski & Pamela Loprest, Will TANF Work for the Most
DisadvantagedFamilies?, in THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE, supra note 37, at 311,
314-16 (finding that approximately seventy-five percent of adults on welfare have
at least one potential barrier to employment and concluding that a sizable group of
adults on TANF have significant barriers to employment).
184. For empirical evidence, see Geoffrey Wallace & Rebecca M. Blank, What
Goes Up Must Come Down?, in ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND WELFARE REFORM 49

(Sheldon Danziger ed., 1999) (finding that unemployment effects on caseloads are
smaller post-PROWRA than pre-PROWRA).
185. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
186. Studies of training programs indicate that they have never been effective.
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work first policies have a limited success in the long run, as
welfare leavers
frequently lose their jobs and rarely have upward
187
mobility.
The foregoing analysis suggests that applying uniform work
requirements for all individuals, regardless of their personal
characteristics and local economic conditions is likely to result in
nonparticipation of the more disadvantaged individuals.
Presently, the major exceptions to TANF work requirements relate
to less disadvantaged individuals who enroll in vocational
educational training or participate in education programs directly
related to employment. 88
Possible improvements for these
distortions could be obtained through adjustments of work
requirements to local economic conditions and increasing the
meager investments in human capital of welfare recipients. 189
Consistent with the discussion above, 9 ' customization of work
requirements to personal characteristics is not a viable option
because it is likely to entail high private and social costs, due to
the discretionary nature of such a process. An exception to this
general rule could be the case of those eligible individuals whose
identifiable characteristics, such as physical and mental
disabilities, prevent them from finding and sustaining jobs.
E.

Time Limits

Time limits on benefit receipt are probably the most dramatic
change introduced by the 1996 welfare reform. PRWORA imposes
a maximum lifetime limit of sixty months on the receipt of TANFfunded aid' 9' and allows states to exempt up to twenty percent of

See, e.g., LaLonde, supra note 74, at 517-18:
Relatively few participants enroll in publicly subsidized vocational courses
long enough to acquire some kind of credential. Participants who enroll in
programs that place them in a subsidized job with a private employer often
receive little or no training other than employment experience. Many participants receive services whose stated objective is simply to facilitate their
search for a job. These features of government training programs underscore their dual purpose: skill development and job placement.
187. Julie Strawn et al., Improving Employment Outcomes Under TANF, in THE
NEW WORLD OF WELFARE, supra note 37, at 223, 223-26.
188. 45 C.F.R. § 261.30 (2004) (defining the term "work activities"); supra note
72 and accompanying text.
189. Expenditures on training programs in the United States amount to 0.1 to
0.2% of the gross domestic product, depending on which programs are counted. As
a share of gross domestic product, nearly all other Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development countries spend much more than the United States on
training programs. LaLonde, supra note 74, at 518.
190. Supra Part I.B.
191. 42 U.S.C. §§ 608(a)(1)(B), 608(a)(7) (2000). It is noteworthy that for TANF
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their caseload from this limit in cases of extreme hardship. 19 2
States are allowed to set shorter time limits if they choose to, or
could continue funding assistance to families entirely out of state
funds after sixty months.
Presently, seventeen states have
93
imposed time limits of less than sixty months for some families,1
twenty-five states and the District of Columbia use the sixtymonth federal time limit, 9 4 and eight states have not imposed
mandatory time limits.'9 ' As noted, PRWORA also limits the
eligibility of childless adults for food stamps to three months in
each thirty-six-month period, unless they are working at least
twenty hours per week.9 6 Time limits should encourage eligible
individuals to save welfare eligibility rights for rainy days, rather
than taking up available benefits and exhausting their eligibility
rights.
Empirical evidence on the effects of time limits is scarce.
Empirical studies suggest that, absent any time limits, twentythree percent of TANF recipients would have hit a five-year period
of cash assistance in exactly five years, thirty-one percent in six
years, and forty-one percent in eight years.' 97 In practice, less than
twenty percent of TANF eligible households understand the
consequences of time limits, have alternatives for welfare, and act
accordingly.' These findings suggest that the present time limits
are effective primarily among the less disadvantaged individuals,
purposes, the term "assistance" excludes benefits that are designed to deal with a
specific crisis or episode of need, are not intended to meet recurrent or ongoing
needs, and will not extend beyond four months. 45 C.F.R. § 260.31 (2004).
192. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(C) (2000). States may exceed the twenty percent limit
and pay from their own funds to cover for the excess exempted families.
193. Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia. Pavetti & Bloom, supra note 101, at 249.
194. Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.
195. Arizona, California, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, New York, Rhode
Island, and Vermont. Id.
196. 7 U.S.C. § 2015(o)(2) (2000).
197. GREG J. DUNCAN, KATHLEEN MULLAN HARRIS & JOHANNE BoIsJoLY, TIME
LIMITS AND WELFARE REFORM: HOW MANY FAMILIES WILL BE AFFECTED? (1998),
available
at
http://www.northwestern.edu/ipr/publications/nupr/nuprv03ni/duncan.html;
Welfare Reform, Subcomm. on Hum. Resources of the H.R. Comm. on Ways and
Means, 104th Cong. 70 (1996) (statement of LaDonna A. Pavetti, Ph.D. Research
Associate, Urban Institute).
198. Behavioral Effects, supra note 110; Time Limits and Welfare Use, supra
note 110; Jeffrey Grogger & Charles Michalopoulos, Welfare Dynamics under Time
Limits, 111 J. POL. ECON. 530 (2003).

20061

UNWELCOME BENEFITS

who postpone participation to preserve eligibility rights. By
contrast, uninformed individuals and other more disadvantaged
individuals use available benefits at the expense of future welfare
assistance. In other words, at present, PROWRA's time limits
discourage participation primarily among the less disadvantaged
individuals, but, in the near future, many of the more
disadvantaged individuals will lose eligibility rights when they
exhaust PRWORA's time limits. It is unclear what goal the
present time limits serve other than narrowing the scope of
welfare programs, while maintaining the appearance of welfare
generosity among those who are unfamiliar with the mechanisms
of welfare programs.
IV. Concluding Remarks
Poverty laws establish redistributive mechanisms intending
to improve the well-being of low-income individuals. Many such
individuals, however, forgo available benefits.
This Article
emphasizes that, in evaluating the performance of welfare
programs, general participation rates are misleading and the focus
should be on the characteristics of nonparticipants and the
magnitude of the forgone benefits. The analysis and evidence
show that impediments to benefits disproportionately burden the
more and the less disadvantaged eligible individuals, although for
different reasons. Nonparticipation of the less disadvantaged
eligible individuals is not so troubling when the forgone benefits
are very small.
By contrast, nonparticipation of the more
disadvantaged eligible individuals and large forgone benefits of
eligible individuals who attempt to conform to norms of selfsufficiency should raise concerns among welfare scholars and
policymakers. These problems cannot be spotted and addressed by
a general reference to the phenomenon of nonparticipation in
welfare programs.
As discussed, PRWORA utilizes general
participation rates for various goals that, as shown in the Article,
distort states' incentives to improve allocation of welfare benefits.
Redistribution and redistributive distortions are a favorite
study topic among legal scholars. It is time for lawyers to take an
interest in the effectiveness of poverty laws to promote the wellbeing of the disadvantaged members of society and to accomplish
desirable redistributive goals.
Present poverty laws, as this
Article presents, often create the impression that benefits are
available for the neediest members of society, while in practice
existing impediments to benefits transform offered redistributive
transfers into unwelcome benefits.

